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Though	  traditionally	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  EU	  Budget	  debate	  is	  on	  the	  expenditure	  side,	  the	  
financing	  side	  of	  the	  story	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  The	  controversial	  part	  of	  this	  story	  is	  
undoubtedly	  the	  call	  for	  more	  “genuine”	  EU	  own	  resources	  and	  the	  correction	  mechanisms	  
that	  allow	  some	  Member	  States	  to	  reduce	  the	  difference	  between	  what	  they	  pay	  into	  the	  EU	  
budget	  and	  what	  they	  receive	  from	  it.	  	  	  
	  
The	   financing	   of	   the	   EU	   budget	   has	   evolved	   significantly	   over	   the	   years.	   Today,	   national	  
contributions	  are	  responsible	  for	  about	  86%	  of	  the	  EU	  budget.	  Yet,	  since	  the	  foundation	  of	  
the	   EU,	   the	   various	   Treaties	   have	   always	   promoted	   EU	   financial	   autonomy	   through	   the	  
principle	   that	   “the	   budget	   shall	   be	   financed	   wholly	   from	   own	   resources”.1	   Initially,	   the	  
resource	   based	   on	   Gross	   National	   Income	   (GNI)	  was	  marginal	   compared	   to	   “genuine”	   EU	  
own	  resources,	  i.e.	  resources	  that	  are	  levied	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  The	  increase	  of	  the	  GNI-­‐based	  
resource	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  a	  growing	  use	  of	  correction	  mechanisms.	  In	  this	  logic	  of	  
juste	   retour,	  Member	   States	   tend	   to	   focus	  on	   their	   own	  net	   financial	   balance	   rather	   than	  
privileging	  European	  public	  interest.	  	  	  
	  
Therefore,	   there	   is	   an	   increasing	   call	   for	   the	   funding	   of	   the	   EU	   budget	   to	   rely	   more	   on	  
genuine	  own	  resources.	  Beyond	  a	  return	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  
genuine	   own	   resources	   in	   the	   EU	   budget	   could	   mitigate	   the	   juste	   retour	   issue,	   increase	  
visibility	   and	   accountability	   to	   the	   EU	   citizens,	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	   pursuit	   of	   EU	   policy	  
objectives.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  Multiannual	  Financial	  Framework	  (MFF)	  for	  the	  
period	  2014-­‐2020,	  the	  European	  Commission	  has	  therefore	  come	  forward	  with	  an	  ambitious	  
proposal	   introducing	  new	  genuine	  own	  resources	   to	   finance	   the	  EU	  budget,	  modifying	   the	  
current	  mechanisms	   via	   a	   system	   of	   lump-­‐sums,	   and	   reducing	   the	   collection	   costs	   on	   the	  
proceeds	  from	  traditional	  own	  resources.	  The	  proposal	  has	  retained	  two	  new	  genuine	  own	  
resources,	  namely	  a	  new	  Value	  Added	  Tax-­‐based	   resource	  and	  a	  Financial	  Transaction	  Tax	  
                                                
1	  Article	  311	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  
-­‐	  WORKING	  PAPER	  European	  Affairs	  Programme	  -­‐ 
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(FTT)-­‐based	   resource.	   Although	   the	   different	   elements	   of	   this	   proposal	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  
difficult	   to	   approve	   politically,	   the	   present	   paper	   aims	   to	   analyse	   each	   of	   them	   so	   as	   to	  
understand	  how	  they	  could	  improve	  the	  current	  system.	  	  	  
	  
After	  a	  quick	  overview	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  EU	  financing	  system	  until	  today	  (part	  1),	  this	  
paper	  will	  examine	  why	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  are	  needed	  but	  politically	  difficult	  to	  
adopt	  (part	  2).	  Then,	  the	  proposed	  EU	  financing	  system	  for	  the	  next	  MFF	  2014-­‐2020	  will	  be	  
analysed	  (part	  3).	  	  
1. EVOLUTION OF THE EU FINANCING SYSTEM UNTIL TODAY 
1.1. The shifting composition of the EU financing system 
The	  financing	  of	  the	  EU	  budget	  has	  evolved	  significantly	  over	  the	  years.	  Directly	  linked	  to	  the	  
evolution	  of	   the	  EU	  policies,	   the	  discussions	  on	   the	  EU	  own	  resources	  have	  always	  been	  a	  
source	  of	  tensions	  between	  Member	  States.	  The	  Treaty	  foresees	  that	  "without	  prejudice	  to	  
other	   revenue,	   the	  budget	  shall	  be	   financed	  wholly	   from	  own	  resources".2	  The	   term	  “own	  
resources”	  is	  mostly	  used	  in	  a	  “generic	  sense”	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  different	  revenue	  sources	  
of	  the	  EU	  budget.	  Yet,	  it	  also	  reflects	  a	  political	  goal,	  namely	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  be	  financed	  
independently	  from	  Member	  States	  and	  their	  financial	  contributions.	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  
quite	  different.	  
	  
At	   present	   the	   EU	   budget	   is	   composed	   mainly	   of	   four	   own	   resources,	   which	   altogether	  
cannot	  exceed	  1.24%	  of	  all	  the	  Member	  States’	  GNI.	  The	  traditional	  own	  resources,	  namely	  
the	   custom	  duties	   and	   agricultural	   levies,	   amount	   to	   13%	  of	   the	  whole	   budget.	   The	   lion’s	  
share,	   i.e.	   around	   75%,	   comes	   from	   the	   Gross	   National	   Income	   (GNI)	   contributions	   of	  
Member	   States.	   Then,	   there	   are	   the	   Value	   Added	   Tax	   (VAT)	   based	   contributions,	   which	  
account	  for	  11%	  of	  the	  budget.	  This	  VAT	  resource	  is	  clearly	  not	  an	  EU	  tax	  as	  the	  percentage	  
collected	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  is	  levied	  by	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  national	  VAT	  base.	  
Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   resource	   is	   subject	   to	   corrections	   in	   order	   to	   adjust	   for	   the	  
different	  national	  payments	  makes	  it	  a	  de	  facto	  GNI	  resource.3	  Thanks	  to	  these	  corrections,	  
each	  country’s	  payment	  is	  more	  or	  less	  proportional	  to	  its	  GNI.	  Therefore,	  around	  86%	  of	  the	  
EU	   budget	   is	   currently	   financed	   by	   national	   contributions.	   The	   remaining	   1%	   comes	   from	  
fines	   imposed	  on	  businesses	   that	  are	   in	  breach	  of	   competition	   law	  as	  well	   as	   taxes	  on	  EU	  
staff	  salaries.	  
	  
Going	  back	  to	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  European	  project,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  whereas	  
the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	   (ECSC)	  was	   financed	  entirely	   through	  a	   tax,	   i.e.	  a	  
levy	   on	   the	   production	   of	   steel,	   and	   thus	   enjoyed	   total	   financial	   independence	   from	   the	  
Member	   States,	   the	   then	   European	   Economic	   Community	   (EEC)	   was	   denied	   any	   such	  
                                                
2	  Ibidem.	  
3	  I.	  Begg,	  Rethinking	  How	  to	  Pay	  for	  Europe,	  European	  Policy	  Analysis,	  Sieps,	  March	  2010  
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financial	   independence	   and	  was	   funded	  exclusively	   by	  means	  of	   direct	   contributions	   from	  
the	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
In	  1970,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  EEC	  should	  “own”	  the	  Community’s	  revenues	  and	  a	  system	  
of	  own	  resources	  was	  put	  into	  place.	  Revenue	  sources	  directly	  related	  to	  common	  European	  
policies	   were	   therefore	   selected.	   These	   revenues	   –	   now	   known	   as	   “traditional	   own	  
resources”	  (TORs)	  –	  are	  the	  proceeds	  from	  agricultural	  levies	  and	  customs	  duties.4	  Member	  
States	  retain	  25%	  of	  these	  proceeds	  to	  compensate	  for	  their	  costs	  of	  collection.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s,	   these	   TORs	   accounted	   for	   about	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   the	   EU	   budget.	   However,	   with	   the	  
progressive	   reduction	   of	   tariffs	   and	   levies	   in	   world	   trade	   and	   the	   convergence	   of	   the	   EU	  
prices	  for	  agricultural	  commodities	  with	  the	  world	  market	  prices,	  it	  rapidly	  became	  clear	  that	  
this	  source	  could	  not	  ensure	  sufficient	  revenue.	  	  	  
	  
Thus,	  in	  the	  late	  1970s,	  the	  TORs	  were	  complemented	  with	  a	  VAT	  resource,	  which	  gradually	  
became	   the	  main	   source	  of	   funding	  until	   the	   late	  1990s.	   This	  VAT	   resource	   comes	   from	  a	  
uniform	   percentage	   levied	   on	   a	   VAT-­‐base	   calculated	   for	   each	   country	   (on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  
harmonised	   methodology).	   This	   national	   VAT-­‐base	   is	   essentially	   statistical	   due	   to	   the	  
complex	   calculations	   required	   in	   order	   to	   compensate	   for	   varying	   zero,	   reduced,	   and	  
standard	   VAT	   rates	   among	   Member	   States.	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   less	   wealthy	  
countries	   from	  having	  to	  pay	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  due	  to	  the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  a	  
VAT	  resource5,	  rules	  for	  limiting	  the	  VAT-­‐base	  (“capping”)	  at	  50%	  of	  GNI	  came	  into	  force	  in	  
1988.	  Initially	  set	  at	  1%	  of	  the	  national	  VAT-­‐base,	  the	  uniform	  percentage	  levied	  for	  the	  EU	  
level	  has	  been	  modified	  several	   times	  until	  eventually	  being	  set	  at	  0,3%.	  For	   the	  period	  of	  
2007-­‐13,	  a	  reduced	  percentage	  was	  established	  for	  Austria,	  Germany,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  
Sweden	  as	  a	  means	  of	  giving	  them	  rebates.6	  The	  proportion	  of	  the	  EU	  budget	  coming	  from	  
VAT	  revenue	  declined	  from	  57%	  to	  about	  11%	  today.	  
	  
However,	   with	   expenditure	   continuing	   to	   rise	   due	   in	   part	   to	   increased	   agricultural	   and	  
cohesion	   spending,	   a	   resource	   based	   on	   Member	   State	   contributions,	   i.e.	   an	   equal	  
percentage	   of	   each	   Member	   State’s	   GNI,	   was	   eventually	   established	   in	   19887.8	   This	   GNI	  
resource	   is	  conceived	  as	  a	  residual	  source	  which	  should	  balance	  revenue	  and	  expenditure.	  
The	   size	  of	   the	  Member	  State	  GNI	   contributions	  depends	  on	   the	  expenditures	   foreseen	   in	  
the	   budget	   as	   well	   as	   the	   revenue	   expected	   from	   alternative	   sources.	   Yet,	   as	  mentioned	  
above,	   the	  overall	   size	  of	   the	  EU	  budget	  may	  not	  exceed	  1,24%	  of	  all	   the	  Member	  States’	  
                                                
4	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  these	  TORs,	  see	  Article	  2(1)(a)	  of	  Council	  Decision	  2007/436/EC,	  Euratom	  
of	  7	  June	  2007	  (ORD	  2007);	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  since	  the	  implementation	  into	  EU	  law	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  round	  
agreements	   on	   multilateral	   trade,	   there	   is	   no	   more	   material	   difference	   between	   agricultural	   duties	   and	  
customs	  duties.	  Hence,	   the	  Commission	  does	  no	   longer	  mention	   agricultural	   levies	   separately	   from	   customs	  
duties.	  	  	  
5	   A	   “regressive	   tax”	   is	   a	   tax	   that	   takes	   a	   larger	   percentage	   from	   low-­‐income	   people	   than	   from	  high-­‐income	  
people.	  In	  the	  VAT	  case,	  consumption	  in	  less	  wealthy	  countries	  tends	  to	  make	  up	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  GNI.	  
6	  Council	  Decision	  2007/436/EC,	  Euratom	  of	  7	  June	  2007	  (ORD	  2007)	  
7	   A	   few	   years	   before,	   the	   GNI	   resource	   had	   already	   been	   introduced	   temporarily	   in	   the	   form	   of	  
intergovernmental	  advances	  when	  the	  Community	  was	  unable	  to	  cover	  its	  expenses.	  
8	  I.	  Begg,	  H.	  Enderlein,	  J.	  Le	  Cacheux	  and	  M.	  Mrak	  (2008),	  Financing	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  budget,	  Directorate	  
General	  for	  Budget,	  European	  Commission,	  April	  2008. 
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GNIs.	  Notwithstanding	  its	  “residual”	  nature,	  the	  share	  of	  GNI	  contributions	  in	  the	  EU	  budget	  
rose	  from	  less	  than	  11%	  to	  around	  75%.	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  the	  four	  sources	  has	  changed	  dramatically,	  over	  
time	   the	   financing	   of	   the	   EU	   budget	   has	   been	  more	   or	   less	   taken	   back	   to	  where	   it	   came	  
from,	  i.e.	  national	  contributions	  based	  on	  economic	  size.	  	  
	  
One	   can	   therefore	   wonder	   whether	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   EU	   budget	   funding	   is	   truly	  
consistent	   with	   the	   Treaty	   provision	   just	   by	   being	   called	   “own	   resources”	   of	   the	   EU.	   As	  
rightly	  stated	  by	  Ian	  Begg9,	  although	  legally	  speaking,	  the	  GNI	  resource	  and	  the	  VAT	  resource	  
are	   part	   of	   the	   Own	   Resources	   Decision	   that	   allocates	   them	   as	   resources	   that	   the	   EU	   is	  
entitled	  to	  receive,	  in	  economic	  terms,	  they	  are	  not	  genuinely	  own	  resources	  that	  belong	  to	  
the	  EU	  level.	   Indeed,	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  inter-­‐governmental	  transfers	  financed	  by	  the	  wide	  
range	   of	   national	   taxes,	   rather	   than	   an	   identifiable	   single	   tax	   or	   other	   revenue	   that	   EU	  
citizens	  can	  assimilate	  to	  the	  EU	  budget.	  Therefore,	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  
term	   “own	   resources”	  which	   includes	   national	   contributions,	   this	   paper	  will	   use	   the	   term	  
“genuine	  own	  resources”	  to	  qualify	  resources	  that,	   in	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  are	   levied	  at	  
the	  EU	  level.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  EU	  budget	  revenue	  1958-­‐2011	  (in	  %	  of	  EU	  GNI)	  
	  
	  
Source: European Commission, DG Budget 
 
 
                                                
9	  Ibidem.	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1.2. The correction mechanisms and the juste retour polemic 
EU	  spending	   is	  unevenly	  distributed	  among	  Member	  States,	   in	  a	  great	  extent	  due	  to	  some	  
particular	  policies.	  For	  instance,	  the	  design	  of	  the	  Common	  Agricultural	  Policy	  favours	  some	  
countries	   over	   others	   and	   the	   cohesion	   policy	   provides	   more	   resources	   to	   less	   affluent	  
states.	  Since	  the	  adhesion	  of	  the	  UK	  to	  the	  EEC	  in	  1973,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  net	  balance,	  i.e.	  the	  
difference	  between	  what	  a	  Member	  State	  pays	  into	  the	  EU	  budget	  and	  what	  it	  receives	  from	  
it	   has	   become	   more	   and	   more	   significant.	   Throughout	   the	   years,	   the	   growing	   share	   of	  
national	   contributions	   to	   the	   EU	   budget	   has	   increasingly	   facilitated	   an	   accounting	   logic	   of	  
juste	  retour.	  This	  logic	  gave	  birth	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  numerous	  correction	  mechanisms	  
through	  political	  arrangements,	  making	  the	  system	  more	  and	  more	  complex.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   early	   1980s,	   the	   UK	   was	   clearly	   recognised	   as	   an	   important	   net	   contributor.	   By	  
importing	   large	   volume	   of	   agricultural	   products	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world,	   it	   had	   to	   pay	  
comparatively	  more	   in	   customs	   duties	   and,	   due	   to	   its	   small	   agricultural	   sector10,	   received	  
only	   a	   low	   share	   of	   the	   EU	   budget.	   After	   various	   unsatisfactory	   deals	   to	   correct	   this	  
inequitable	  situation,	  the	  UK	  was	  finally	  granted	  its	  famous	  rebate	  in	  1984,	  allowing	  for	  it	  to	  
be	  reimbursed	  66%	  of	  the	  net	  imbalance.	  This	  correction	  mechanism	  consists	  in	  a	  reduction	  
of	   the	   UK’s	   VAT-­‐base	   that	   is	   financed	   by	   all	   the	   Member	   States,	   in	   proportion	   to	   each	  
country’s	   share	   in	   VAT	   transfers.	   Also	   in	   1984,	   Germany	   	   -­‐	   as	   another	   important	   net	  
contributor	  -­‐	  was	  allowed	  to	  pay	  only	  a	  share	  of	  its	  normal	  contribution	  to	  the	  UK	  rebate.	  In	  
1999,	   three	   other	   countries,	   namely	   the	   Netherlands,	   Austria	   and	   Sweden,	   were	   also	  
granted	  rebates	  on	  the	  normal	  costs	  paid	  by	  all	  Member	  States	  to	  the	  UK	  rebate.	  Contrary	  to	  
the	   corrections	   granted	   to	   Germany,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Austria	   and	   Sweden,	   the	   British	  
rebate	   is	   not	   a	   temporary	   correction.	   Since	   it	   has	   been	   introduced	   in	   the	  Own	  Resources	  
Decision	  of	  1984,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  modified	  by	  unanimity,	  which	  tends	  to	  give	  it	  a	  “permanent”	  
character.	  	  
	  
In	  1999,	  it	  was	  also	  agreed	  that	  the	  percentages	  the	  Member	  States	  were	  allowed	  to	  retain	  
as	   collection	   costs	   on	   the	   proceeds	   of	   the	   traditional	   own	   resources	   (TOR)	   would	   be	  
increased	  from	  10%	  to	  25%.	  This	  percentage	  is	  often	  considered	  as	  particularly	  beneficial	  to	  
the	  Netherlands	  and	  Belgium	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  the	  EU’s	  imports	  from	  
third	   countries	   goes	   through	   their	   ports.	   As	   such,	   these	   collection	   costs	   are	   regarded	   by	  
some	   as	   hidden	   correction	  mechanisms.	   However,	   not	   only	   the	   percentage	   applies	   to	   all	  
Member	  States,	  but	  also	  the	  amounts	  retained	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  correct	  excessive	  net	  positions	  
of	  Member	  States	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  corrections.	  Indeed,	  the	  collection	  costs	  on	  the	  TOR	  are	  
not	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  calculating	  the	  net	  positions	  of	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
In	  2007,	  further	  corrections	  were	  introduced	  as	  part	  of	  the	  political	  agreement	  on	  the	  Multi-­‐
Annual	   Financial	   Framework	   (MFF)	   2007-­‐2013.	   A	   reduction	   in	   the	   rate	   of	   call	   on	   the	   VAT	  
resource	  was	  granted	  once	  again	  to	  Austria	  (0,225%),	  Germany	  (0,15%),	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  
Sweden	  (0,10%),	  compared	  to	  the	  rate	  of	  call	  of	  all	  other	  Member	  States,	  which	  was	  frozen	  
at	   0,3%	   of	   the	   national	   VAT-­‐base.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Sweden	   obtained	   a	  
                                                
10 At	  that	  time,	  the	  Common	  Agricultural	  Policy	  represented	  around	  70%	  of	  the	  EU	  budget.	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gross	   reduction	   of	   respectively	   €605	   and	   €150million	   on	   their	   GNI-­‐based	   annual	  
contributions.	   Finally,	   the	   2007-­‐2013	  MFF	   includes	   a	   range	   of	   unexplained	  ad	   hoc	   special	  
payments	  under	  the	  Structural	  Funds,	  including	  for	  example	  €200	  million	  for	  Prague	  and	  €75	  
million	  for	  Bavaria.11	  
	  
Behind	  the	  argument	  of	  equity,	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  net	  budgetary	  balance	  is	  not	  well	  founded.	  
There	  is	  a	  mistaken	  perception	  that	  net	  contributions	  mirror	  the	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  
net	   benefits	   and	   costs	   from	   the	   EU	  budget.12	   The	   calculations	   are	   thus	   arbitrary	   on	  many	  
grounds.	  Firstly,	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  expenditure	  in	  favour	  of	  programmes	  implemented	  in	  third	  
States	  has	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  participating	  European	  companies,	  although	  these	  costs	  are	  
not	   included	   in	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   net	   contribution.	   Secondly,	   the	   custom	   duties	   and	  
agricultural	   levies	   (traditional	   own	   resources)	   are	   levied	   in	   the	   country	   where	   the	   import	  
takes	  place	  while	   it	   is	  not	  always	   the	  country	  of	  destination	  of	   the	  product,	  which	  distorts	  
the	   figures.	  Finally,	  and	  most	   importantly,	   the	  calculations	  of	  net	  balances	   fail	   to	   take	   into	  
account	  the	  wider	  net	  benefits	  of	  the	  process	  of	  integration,	  particularly	  the	  participation	  to	  
the	   single	   market.	   As	   rightly	   stated	   by	   Jutta	   Haug	   et	   al.	   (2011)13,	   “this	   narrow-­‐minded	  
accounting	  approach	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  process	  of	  European	  integration	  as	  a	  ‘zero-­‐
sum’	  game,	  in	  which	  what	  some	  countries	  win	  is	  always	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  It	  fails	  to	  
understand	   that	   most	   EU	   policies,	   and	   the	   process	   of	   integration	   itself,	   generate	   mutual	  
benefits”.	  As	  a	   result,	   rather	   than	  privileging	   the	  European	  public	   interest,	  Member	  States	  
tend	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  own	  net	   financial	  balance,	   leading	  to	  a	  sub-­‐optimal	  allocation	  of	  EU	  
spending.	  	  	  
2. GENUINE OWN RESOURCES: NECESSARY BUT POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO ADOPT 
It	  has	  become	  apparent	  that	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  “own	  resources”	  
has	   strongly	   evolved	   over	   time.	   Today,	   the	   EU’s	   own	   resources	   are	   largely	   composed	   of	  
national	  contributions.	  Yet,	  when	  one	  speaks	  about	  “genuine	  own	  resources”,	  it	  is	  with	  the	  
intent	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  which	  has	  always	  argued	  for	  the	  EU’s	  financial	  
autonomy.	   As	   such,	   “genuine	   own	   resources”	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   resources	   that	   are	  
levied	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  such	  as	  an	  EU	  tax.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  there	  have	  been	  strong	  calls	  
for	  a	  return	  to	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources.	  In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  
negotiations	  on	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  EU	  budget,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  firstly	  examine	  the	  positive	  
elements	  of	   the	  current	  system	  before	  analysing	  why	   it	   is	  nevertheless	  necessary	   to	  move	  
towards	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources.	  
	  
The	  current	  system	  works	  fairly	  well.	  Although	  the	  increasing	  share	  of	  the	  GNI	  resource	  has	  
incited	   the	   development	   of	   complex	   correction	   mechanisms,	   this	   resource	   has	   the	   great	  
                                                
11	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  Financial	  perspective	  2007-­‐2013,	  CADREFIN	  268,	  Brussels,	  19	  December	  
2005,	  pp.	  17-­‐20.	  
12	  I.	  Begg	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  op.	  cit.	  n°	  8,	  p.	  57–58;	  J.	  Le	  Cacheux	  (2007),	  Funding	  the	  EU	  budget	  with	  a	  genuine	  own	  
resource:	  the	  case	  for	  an	  European	  tax,	  Notre	  Europe,	  p.	  5.	  
13	   J.	   Haug,	   A.	   Lamassoure,	   G.	   Verhofstadt,	   D.	   Gros,	   P.	   De	  Gauwe,	   G.	   Ricard-­‐Nihoul	   and	   E.	   Rubio,	  Europe	   for	  
Growth	  –	  For	  a	  Radical	  Change	  in	  Financing	  the	  EU,	  CEPS	  and	  Notre	  Europe,	  April	  2011.	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advantage	   of	   being	   simple	   and	   easy	   to	   administer.	   Its	   residual	   nature	   ensures	   that	   all	  
planned	  expenditure	  will	  be	  financed	  by	  sufficient	  and	  stable	  revenue.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  yield	  
of	   a	   particular	   EU	   tax	   can	   be	   unpredictable.	   Hence,	   in	   the	   case	   where	   the	   revenue	   of	  
resources	   levied	   at	   the	   EU	   level	   would	   not	   be	   sufficient,	   the	   GNI	   resource	   would	   still	   be	  
necessary	  as	  a	  residual	  income	  (though	  in	  a	  smaller	  extent)	  in	  order	  to	  balance	  the	  budget.	  
Besides,	   if	  the	  revenue	  of	  (an)	  EU	  tax(es)	  came	  to	  exceed	  the	  expenditure,	  a	  way	  to	  return	  
the	  money	  would	  need	  to	  be	  devised.	  Finally,	   the	  current	  system	  is	  relatively	   fair	  amongst	  
Member	  States	  as	  each	  of	  them	  gives	  an	  equal	  proportion	  of	  its	  national	  income	  to	  the	  EU	  
budget	  (horizontal	  fairness).	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   advantages	  of	   national	   contributions,	   there	   are	   several	   reasons	   in	   favour	  of	   a	  
shift	  towards	  new	  genuine	  own	  resources.	  First	  of	  all,	  in	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  and	  financial	  
crisis	  like	  today,	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  would	  reduce	  the	  pressure	  
on	  national	  budgets	  by	  diminishing	  the	  GNI	  contributions.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  many	  people	  believe	  that	  using	  genuine	  own	  resources	  such	  as	  an	  EU	  tax	  would	  
be	  the	  only	  way	  to	  diminish	  the	  “poisonous”	  emphasis	  on	  juste	  retour.14	  The	  current	  system	  
of	  direct	  contributions	  from	  Member	  States	  highlights	  the	  amounts	  being	  transferred	  to	  the	  
EU	  and	  induces	  governments	  to	  book	  these	  as	  expenditure	  items	  in	  their	  national	  budgets.15	  
It	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  tax	  levied	  at	  the	  EU	  level	  would	  not	  prevent	  Member	  States	  from	  calculating	  
their	   own	   net	   contributions	   as	   the	   revenues	   of	   this	   resource	   would	   still	   be	   collected	   by	  
national	  authorities	  and	  transferred	  to	  the	  EU.	  However,	   the	  collected	  funds	  would	  not	  be	  
included	   in	   the	   national	   budgets	   and	   the	   net	   balances	   would	   be	   much	   more	   difficult	   to	  
calculate	  due	  to	  the	  cross-­‐boundary	  nature	  of	  an	  EU-­‐tax.	  For	  instance,	  Member	  States	  tend	  
to	  include	  the	  proceeds	  from	  custom	  duties	  and	  agricultural	   levies	  -­‐	  considered	  as	  genuine	  
own	   resources	   -­‐	   in	   their	   calculations	   of	   the	   net	   budgetary	   balance.	   However,	   it	   has	   been	  
explained	  above	  that	  these	  calculations	  tend	  to	  be	   incorrect	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  tax	   is	  
not	   always	   levied	   in	   the	   country	   where	   the	   goods	   taxed	   are	   consumed.	   Consequently,	   a	  
system	  of	  genuine	  own	  resources	  could	  shift	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  debate	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  
the	   tax	   burden	   among	   national	   budgets	   towards	   the	   more	   relevant	   question	   of	   the	  
distribution	  among	  the	  different	  classes	  of	  citizens.16	  	  
	  
This	  last	  observation	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  current	  system	  is	  arguably	  fair	   in	  
the	   case	   of	   national	   contributions	   between	   Member	   States	   (horizontal	   fairness)	   but	   not	  
between	   the	   different	   classes	   of	   citizens	   (vertical	   fairness).	   As	   national	   tax	   systems	   differ	  
among	  Member	  States,	  EU	  citizens	  do	  not	  participate	   to	  national	   contributions	   for	   the	  EU	  
budget	  according	  to	   their	  ability	   to	  pay,	   i.e.	  proportionally	   to	   their	  wealth.	  A	  shift	   towards	  
more	   genuine	   own	   resources	   “might	   help	   to	  move	   the	   debates	   away	   from	   a	   limited	   and	  
dubious	  conception	  of	   ‘horizontal	  fairness’	  (based	  only	  on	  a	  purely	  accounting	  logic	  of	   ‘net	  
                                                
14	  J.	  Le	  Cacheux,	  Budget	  européen:	  le	  poison	  du	  juste	  retour,	  Notre	  Europe,	  série	  “études	  et	  recherches”,	  No.	  41,	  
juin	  2005;	  J.	  Haug	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°13.	  
15	  I.	  Begg	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  op.	  cit.	  n°8,	  p.	  57-­‐58.	  	  
16	  Ibidem,	  p.	  57.	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national	   contributions’)	   towards	   a	   well-­‐founded	   discussions	   on	   horizontal	   and	   vertical	  
fairness	  and	  efficiency	  considerations.”17	  
	  
Given	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  citizens,	  another	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  genuine	  own	  
resources	  is	  that	  they	  would	  help	  to	  increase	  the	  EU’s	  legitimacy	  and	  accountability	  towards	  
its	  citizens.	  Of	  course,	  such	  genuine	  own	  resources	  could	  also	  create	  the	  negative	  image	  of	  
the	  EU	  imposing	  additional	  taxes.	  Yet,	  in	  reality,	  by	  levying	  resources	  at	  the	  EU	  level,	  the	  EU’s	  
funding	   would	   become	   more	   visible	   to	   citizens-­‐taxpayers,	   de	   facto	   creating	   a	   closer	  
connection	  and	  drawing	  them	  closer	  into	  the	  EU’s	  expenditure-­‐decisions.18	  	  
	  
Finally,	  such	  a	  move	  could	  allow	  the	  EU’s	  budget	  decision-­‐making	  process	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  
delivering	   public	   policies	   that	   conform	   to	   the	   EU	   public	   interest	   and	   individual	   citizens’	  
preferences.19	  A	  proposed	  EU	  tax	  could	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  a	  specific	  EU	  policy,	  thus	  making	  
genuine	   own	   resources	   more	   efficient	   in	   their	   contribution	   to	   the	   effective	   pursuit	   of	  
European	  policy	  objectives.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   that	   finding	   an	   agreement	   between	   the	  Member	   States	   on	   the	   introduction	   of	  
more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  is	  difficult	  to	  reach	  politically.	  Not	  only	  do	  Member	  States	  fear	  
a	  loss	  of	  sovereignty	  should	  they	  give	  up	  on	  taxing	  power,	  but	  any	  tax	  format	  levied	  at	  the	  
EU	   level	   necessarily	   implies	   winners	   and	   losers.	   However,	   introducing	  more	   genuine	   own	  
resources	  would	   bring	   the	   significant	   improvements	  mentioned	  here	   above	  while	   keeping	  
most	   of	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	   current	   system.	   Indeed,	   the	   GNI-­‐based	   resource	   could	   be	  
largely	  replaced	  by	  genuine	  own	  resources	  but	  maintained	  as	  a	  residual	  resource	  to	  assure	  
the	  balance	  of	  the	  EU	  budget.	  The	  EU	  would	  be	  financially	  more	  independent	  from	  Member	  
States,	  implying	  an	  important	  political	  step	  towards	  more	  European	  integration.	  	  
3. THE PROPOSED EU FINANCING SYSTEM FOR THE MFF 2014-2020 
In	  June	  2011,	  the	  European	  Commission	  presented	  its	  proposal	  for	  the	  EU’s	  next	  MFF	  2014-­‐
2020.20	  	  The	  Commission	  proposed	  raising	  the	  EU	  2014-­‐2020	  budget	  from	  the	  current	  €976	  
billion	  to	  €1,025	  billion,	  representing	  a	  4,8%	  increase.	  However,	  the	  negotiations	  have	  since	  
then	  introduced	  significant	  changes	  relative	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal.	  In	  order	  to	  have	  
the	  most	   accurate	   information,	   this	   paper	  will	   take	   the	   last	   proposal	   of	   European	  Council	  
President	  Van	  Rompuy	  released	  during	  the	  summit	  in	  November	  201221	  as	  a	  reference	  of	  the	  
state	  of	  play	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  According	  to	  this	  document,	  the	  proposed	  level	  of	  the	  next	  
                                                
17	  J.	  Haug	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°	  13.	  
18	  Ibidem,	  p.	  63.	  
19	  Ibidem,	  p.	  57.	  
20	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	   Decision	   on	   the	   System	   of	   Own	   Resources	   of	   the	  
European	  Union,	  COM(2011)	  510	  final,	  Brussels,	  29	  June	  2011,	  available	  on:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/proposal_council_own_resources_en.pdf	  
21	   European	   Council	   (2012),	   Draft	   conclusions,	   SN	   37/12,	   22	   November	   2012,	   available	   on:	  
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/HvR%20II.pdf	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MFF	  is	  now	  set	  at	  €972	  billion,	  which	  is	  less	  than	  the	  current	  MFF	  level.	  This	  would	  represent	  
1,01%	  of	  EU	  GNI.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Van	  Rompuy	  proposal,	   the	  reform	  of	   the	  EU	  financing	  system	  “should	  be	  
guided	  by	  the	  overall	  objectives	  of	  simplicity,	  transparency	  and	  equity”.	  This	  proposal	  took	  
over	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal,	  which	  for	  the	  first	  time	  decided	  to	  introduce	  new	  genuine	  
own	  resources,	  a	  modification	  of	  the	  current	  correction	  mechanisms	  via	  a	  system	  of	   lump-­‐
sums	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  collection	  costs	  on	  the	  TOR’s	  proceeds.	  	  
	  
The	   following	   sections	  will	   respectively	   analyse	   and	   see	   to	  what	   extent	   the	   Commission’s	  
and	   the	   European	   Council	   President’s	   proposals	   on	   the	   revenue	   side	   would	   improve	   the	  
current	  system	  by	  making	  it	  simpler,	  fairer	  and	  more	  transparent.	  	  
3.1. Introducing new genuine own resources 
The	  proposal	  to	  introduce	  new	  genuine	  own	  resources	  implies	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  the	  current	  
structure	  of	  own	  resources.	  National	  contributions	   that	  currently	  account	   for	  85.3%	  of	   the	  
budget	  could	  be	  significantly	  reduced.22	  In	  order	  to	  replace	  national	  contributions,	  new	  taxes	  
would	  be	   levied	  at	   the	  EU	   level.	  Among	  other	  options,	   the	  Commission	   retained	   two	  new	  
own	   resources	   (subsequently	   taken	   over	   by	   the	   European	   Council	   President),	   namely	   a	  
Financial	  Transaction	  Tax	  (FTT)	  and	  a	  new	  VAT	  resource.	  	  
	  
Although	   they	   have	   not	   been	   retained,	   the	   other	   options	   of	   EU	   taxes	   are	   worth	   being	  
mentioned,	  as	  they	  remain	  very	  interesting	  options	  for	  future	  negotiations:	  	  
• A	  Financial	  Activities	  Tax;	  
• A	  tax	  on	  air	  transport;	  
• A	   share	   of	   the	   revenues	   of	   the	   auction	   of	   allowances	   from	   the	   Emissions	   Trading	  
Scheme;	  
• An	  Energy	  Tax;	  
• An	  EU	  Corporate	  Income	  Tax.23	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   analyse	   the	   new	   VAT	   and	   the	   FTT	   as	   new	   genuine	   own	   resources	   of	   the	   EU	  
budget,	  we	  have	  borrowed	  a	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  criteria	  established	  in	  a	  background	  study	  
written	   by	   Begg,	   Enderlein,	   Le	   Cacheux	   and	   Mrak	   for	   DG	   Budget	   of	   the	   European	  
Commission	  in	  2008	  (see	  figure	  2).24	  These	  criteria	  are	  summarised	  in	  Figure	  3.	  Each	  of	  them	  
                                                
22	   According	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   proposal,	   national	   contributions	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   40,3%	   by	   2020.	  
However,	   this	   figure	  must	  be	   taken	  cautiously	  given	   that,	  as	  mentioned,	   the	   stakes	  of	   the	  negotiations	  have	  
already	  changed.	  
23	   The	   Commission	   justifies	  why	   it	   has	   not	   retained	   the	   other	   options	   in	   the	   following	   document:	   European	  
Commission	   (2011),	   Financing	   the	   EU	   budget:	   Report	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   own	   resources	   system.	  
Accompanying	  the	  document	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Decision	  on	  the	  system	  of	  own	  resources	  of	  the	  European	  
Union,	   Commission	   Staff	   Working	   Paper,	   SEC(2011)	   876	   final/2,	   Brussels,	   27	   October	   2011,	   available	   on:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/documents/fin_fwk1420/proposal_council_own_resources__annex
_en.pdf	  	  
24	  I.	  Begg	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  op.	  cit.	  n°8.	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can	  serve	  to	  assess	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  sides	  of	  the	  proposed	  new	  own	  resources.	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  an	  “ideal	  resource"	  meeting	  all	  the	  criteria	  does	  not	  exist.	  The	  objective	  is	  thus	  to	  
analyse	  each	  criterion	  in	  order	  to	  see	  where	  a	  potential	  new	  resource	  performs	  well	  or	  not.	  
This	   should	   allow	   for	   an	   objective	   assessment	   prior	   to	   any	   shift	   in	   the	   way	   the	   EU	   is	  
financed.25	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Criteria	  for	  assessing	  potential	  EU	  own	  resources	  
 
CRITERION EXPLANATION 
Economic consideration Criteria that reflect analytic factors derived from economic theory 
1. Economic efficiency/distortion effects  Does the resource affect only some sectors of 
economic activity, with adverse (or, in the case of 
"Pigouvian" taxes, favourable) allocative effects? 
2. Vertical equity in promoting     redistribution Ability to pay at the level of the citizen 
3.  Horizontal equity among equivalent citizens Are individuals in similar circumstances treated 
equivalently? 
4. Fairness between Member States - GNI per capita Ability to pay at the level of the Member State 
5. Fairness between Member States - appropriability of 
revenue 
Does tax collection at the Member State level fail to 
reflect the true incidence of the tax among Member 
States? 
Political and administrative factors Criteria that are political in character or concern implementation 
6.  Sufficiency of revenue Does the resource raise enough revenue to cover all, or 
a sizeable proportion of the total needed? 
7. Stability of revenue source Does the yield vary, e.g. Over the economic cycle? 
8. Other administrative considerations Any other issues, such as susceptibility to evasion, 
collection costs, need for revenue sharing etc.? 
9. Link to EU policy concerns How well does the proposed tax correspond to policy 
domains in which the EU is prominent?  
10. Visibility and transparency to tax-payers Will individual taxpayers be more aware that they are 
contributing to the EU when paying the tax?  
11. Autonomy for the EU level of government Is the resource genuinely 'owned' by the EU and where 
does 'the power to tax' effectively lie? 
Source:	  Begg,	  Enderlein,	  Le	  Cacheux	  and	  Mrak	  (2008)	  
                                                
25	  Ibidem.	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The	   relative	   importance	  given	   to	  each	  of	   these	  criteria	  may	  or	  may	  not	  correspond	   to	   the	  
views	  of	   the	  reader,	  but	   in	   the	   framework	  of	   the	  EU	  negotiations	   for	   the	  adoption	  of	  new	  
own	  resources,	  some	  criteria	  are	  clearly	  more	  salient	  than	  others.	  	  
	  
Iain	  Begg	  explains	   that	  behind	  each	   criterion,	   there	  are	  different	   interests	  at	   stake	  among	  
the	   diverse	   actors	   of	   the	   policy-­‐making	   process.26	   Autonomy,	   for	   instance,	   is	   a	   very	  
contentious	  criterion.	  Most	  Member	  States	  are	  unwilling	  to	  part	  with	  their	  power	  to	  tax	   in	  
favour	  of	  the	  EU	  level	  as	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  lose	  any	  sovereignty.	  Given	  that	  the	  EU	  Own	  
Resources	  Decision	   requires	  unanimity	   in	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	   the	  autonomy	  criterion	  
may	  well	  act	  as	  a	  veto	  player	  against	  any	  EU	  level	  tax	  adoption	  process.	  Member	  States	  are	  
also	  very	  concerned	  about	  the	  fairness	  criterion	  that	  reflects	  itself	  in	  the	  juste	  retour	  debate.	  
Both	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Commission	  consider	  appropriate	  to	  link	  the	  way	  the	  
EU	   is	   financed	   to	   the	   policies	   it	   pursues.	   The	   European	   Parliament	   also	   gives	   much	  
importance	  to	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  process	  and	  the	  Commission	  is	  very	  concerned	  about	  
sufficiency	  and	  stability	  of	  revenue	  as	  it	   is	  the	  one	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  EU	  
budget.	  As	  for	  citizens,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  concerned	  by	  the	  equity	  criteria.	  	  
	  
In	  a	  nutshell,	   this	  approach	   is	  an	  excellent	  means	  not	  only	  to	  assess	  what	  are	  the	  relevant	  
criteria	   that	   a	   new	   resource	   should	   meet	   according	   to	   one’s	   views,	   but	   also	   to	   analyse	  
whether	  this	  resource	  has	  any	  chance	  of	  being	  adopted	  according	  to	  the	  mains	  interests	  of	  
the	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  
 
3.1.1.	  A	  new	  VAT-­based	  resource	  	  
 
The	  Commission	  proposed	  to	  abolish	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  and	  to	  replace	  it	  with	  a	  
new	  own	  resource	  based	  on	  VAT	  as	  well.	  This	   is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  revision	  of	  the	  future	  of	  
VAT	  initiated	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  VAT	  fraud,	  improve	  the	  administration	  of	  
the	  tax	  and	  strengthen	  harmonisation	  of	  VAT	  systems	  across	  the	  EU.	  As	  such,	  the	  VAT-­‐based	  
resource	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  EU	  policy	  via	  the	  objective	  of	  developing	  a	  European	  VAT	  policy	  
in	  line	  with	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  internal	  market.	  	  
	  
The	  idea	  is	  to	  allocate	  a	  share	  of	  the	  gains	  derived	  from	  this	  VAT	  reform	  to	  the	  EU	  budget.	  
While	  the	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  accounted	  for	  11,2%	  of	  revenue	   in	  the	  EU	  budget	  for	  2011,	  
the	  new	  VAT	  resources	  could	  account	  for	  18.1%.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  that	  
foresaw	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  new	  VAT	  by	  1	  January	  2018	  at	  the	  latest,	  the	  Van	  Rompuy	  
document	  proposes	  to	  introduce	  it	  by	  1	  January	  2021	  at	  the	  latest.	  The	  postponement	  of	  the	  
new	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  does	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  its	  future	  adoption.	  	  
	  
The	   existing	   VAT-­‐based	   resource	   was	   first	   implemented	   in	   the	   1970s.	   However,	   since	   its	  
inception	  it	  has	  faced	  considerable	  critique	  about	  several	  of	  its	  aspects.	  The	  most	  important	  
one	  is	  that	  the	  resource	  is	  levied	  on	  a	  “virtual”	  harmonised	  VAT-­‐base	  calculated	  by	  Member	  
                                                
26	  I.	  Begg	  (2011),	  An	  EU	  Tax	  -­‐	  Overdue	  Reform	  or	  Federalist	  Fantasy?,	  Friedrich	  Ebert	  Stiftung,	  February	  2011.	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States,	  which	  is	  “complex	  to	  the	  point	  of	  incomprehensibility”.27	  The	  VAT-­‐base	  is	  subjected	  
to	  several	  adjustments	  in	  order	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  varying	  zero,	  reduced,	  and	  standard	  
rates	   between	  Member	   States.	   The	   resulting	   harmonised	   VAT-­‐base	  may	   be	   subsequently	  
capped	  (at	  50%	  of	  GNI)	  and	  takes	  into	  account	  compensation	  arrangements	  for	  the	  UK.	  All	  
these	   adjustments	   are	   designed	   to	   address	   differences	   in	   VAT	   implementation	   between	  
Member	  States.	  Therefore,	  the	  current	  VAT	  method	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  second	  GNI	  resource.	  	  
	  
Because	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   calculations	   required	   by	   the	   VAT	   resource,	   the	   lack	   of	  
transparency	  for	  citizens,	  and	  the	  high	  administrative	  costs	  for	  businesses,	  several	  experts28	  
have	  come	  to	  support	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  VAT	  as	  an	  own	  resource.	  	  
	  
The	   new	   VAT	   method	   proposed	   by	   the	   Commission	   is	   based	   on	   a	   revenue	   transfer	  
mechanism	  and	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  four	  main	  steps:	  
• The	   new	   VAT	   resource	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   based	   upon	   VAT	   receipts.	   However,	   in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  that	  only	  VAT	  receipts	  are	  included,	  about	  half	  of	  the	  Member	  States	  
will	   need	   to	   continue	   correcting	   their	   figures	   to	   exclude	   interest	   and	   penalties.	  
Moreover,	  some	  Member	  States	  will	  also	  need	  to	  continue	  making	  some	  adjustments	  
in	  order	  to	  take	  into	  account	  overseas	  territories,	  the	  specific	  VAT	  treatment	  granted	  
to	  some	  peripheral	  regions	  and	  subsidies	  they	  deliver	  through	  the	  VAT	  system.29	  	  	  
• The	   key	   element	   of	   the	   proposal	   is	   to	   use	   a	   uniform	   percentage	   of	   VAT	   receipts	  
accruing	   from	   standard-­‐rated	   supplies,	   i.e.	   goods	   and	   services,	   in	   every	   Member	  
State.	  All	  the	  supplies	  subject	  to	  reduced	  or	  zero	  tax	  rates	  at	  the	  national	  level	  would	  
be	  exempted.	  The	  uniform	  percentage	  removes	  the	  need	  for	  each	  Member	  State	  to	  
compensate	   the	  effects	  of	   their	   own	  VAT	   taxation	   arrangements	  with	   those	  of	   the	  
other	  Member	  States	  by	  providing	  a	  single	  ratio	  that	  can	  be	  used	  by	  all.30	  With	  this	  
new	  system,	  much	  of	  the	  calculation	  efforts	  currently	  undertaken	  by	  Member	  States	  
will	  move	  to	  the	  Commission.	  The	  latter	  will	  be	  mainly	   in	  charge	  of	  establishing	  the	  
uniform	  percentage.	  That	  percentage	  would	  be	  valid	  for	  the	  period	  of	  a	  MFF.	  	  
• Member	  States	  will	  then	  apply	  the	  uniform	  percentage	  to	  their	  adjusted	  receipts.	  The	  
resulting	  chargeable	  VAT	  receipts	  figure	  is	  converted	  to	  a	  tax-­‐base	  value	  using	  each	  
Member	   State’s	   actual	   VAT	   standard	   rate.	   The	   tax-­‐base	   retained	   for	   the	   transfer	  
towards	  the	  EU	  level	  will	  thus	  focus	  on	  the	  harmonisation	  that	  actually	  exists,	  i.e.	  the	  
smallest	   common	   denominator	   of	   supplies	   at	   standard	   rates	   in	   all	   national	   VAT	  
systems.	  	  	  
                                                
27	   European	   Court	   of	   Auditors	   (2008),	   Response	   by	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Auditors	   to	   the	   Commission’s	  
communication	  ‘Reforming	  the	  Budget,	  Changing	  Europe’,	  April	  2008,	  §26-­‐28.	  
28	  F.	  Heinemann,	  P.	  Mohl	  and	  S.	  Osterloh	  (2008),	  Reform	  Options	  for	  the	  EU	  Own	  Resources	  System,	  Research	  
Project	  8/06,	  commissioned	  by	  the	  German	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  January	  2008.	  
29	  European	  Commission	   (2011),	  Proposal	   for	  a	  Council	   regulation	  on	   the	  methods	  and	  procedure	   for	  making	  
available	  the	  own	  resource	  based	  on	  the	  value	  added	  tax,	  COM	  (2011)	  737	  final,	  Brussels,	  9	  November	  2011.	  
30	  European	  Commission	  (2012),	  Working	  Document	  of	  the	  Commission	  Services	  -­‐	  The	  uniform	  percentage	  for	  
the	  new	  VAT	  own	   resource,	  what	   it	   represents	  and	  how	   it	  will	  be	  established,	  COMBUD	  110/12,	  Brussels,	  26	  
March	  2012.	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• National	  tax	  administrations	  will	   finally	  transfer	  a	  share	  of	  the	  chargeable	  VAT-­‐base	  
to	   the	   EU	   level.	   As	   stated	   in	   the	   proposal	   for	   the	   next	  MFF	   2014-­‐2020,	   this	   share	  
would	  be	  set	  at	  1%	  (not	  exceeding	  2%)	  of	  the	  chargeable	  VAT-­‐base.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  revenue	  estimates	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  2009	  data)	  could	  reach	  
between	   €20,9	   billion	   and	   €50,4	   billion.31	   The	   revenue	   estimates	   are	   dependent	   on	   the	  
degree	  of	  harmonisation	  of	  the	  tax	  base,	  i.e.	  the	  common	  standard	  rated	  supplies.	  	  
	  
Compared	  to	  the	  current	  system,	  not	  only	  does	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  
corrections	  Member	   States	   need	   to	   apply	   to	   their	   VAT	   receipts,	   but	   it	   also	   eliminates	   the	  
need	   to	   calculate	   compensations	   to	   the	   VAT-­‐base.	   The	  method	   uses	   real	   data	   instead	   of	  
forecast-­‐based	  payments	  and	  year-­‐end	  balance	  exercises.	  	  
	  
The	   Commission	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   new	   system	   would	   radically	   simplify	   the	   current	  
procedure,	   ensure	   equal	   treatment	   of	   taxpayers	   in	   all	   Member	   States,	   reduce	   the	  
administrative	  burden	  for	  Member	  States,	  strengthen	  the	  link	  with	  EU	  VAT	  policy,	  and	  make	  
the	  procedure	  more	  transparent	  and	  predictable.32	  The	  following	  paragraphs	  will	  analyse	  the	  
accuracy	  of	   these	   claims	  by	   assessing	   the	  new	  VAT	   resource	  using	   the	   criteria	   of	   Figure	   3	  
mentioned	  above.	  	  
a.	  	  Economic	  considerations	   	  
	  
With	   regard	   to	   the	   criterion	   of	  economic	   efficiency/distortion	   effects,	   the	   new	   proposed	  
VAT	   will	   probably	   have	   a	   limited	   impact	   compared	   to	   the	   current	   system.	   In	   a	  
Communication	  on	  VAT	  reform,	  the	  Commission	  has	  acknowledged	  that	  ”Member	  States	  are	  
understandably	   unwilling	   to	   take	   any	   risks	   that	   are	   triggered	   by	   reform	   efforts	   and	   could	  
threaten	  VAT	  revenues,	  which	  accounted	   for	  around	  €784	  billion	   in	  2009”.33	  Although	   it	   is	  
anticipated	   that	   the	   new	   VAT-­‐based	   resource	  would	   reduce	  Member	   States’	   revenues	   by	  
providing	   more	   funds	   to	   the	   EU	   level	   than	   the	   current	   VAT-­‐based	   resource,	   any	   such	  
reduction	  would	  be	  offset	  accordingly	  by	  a	  reduction	  on	  the	  GNI-­‐based	  resource.	  The	  new	  
VAT	   resource	   will	   not	   really	   alter	   economic	   behaviour	   compared	   to	   the	   current	   situation	  
regarding	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  various	  VAT	  rates	  among	  Member	  States	  will	   remain	  the	  same.	  
However,	  the	  VAT	  is	  used	  by	  Member	  States	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  change	  purchasing	  power.	  
With	  the	  new	  system,	  it	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  anymore	  to	  transform	  standard	  rated	  supplies,	  
which	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  uniform	  percentage,	   in	  reduced	  or	  zero	  rated	  supplies.	  This	  might	  
reduce	  the	  distortions	  of	  competition	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  Nevertheless,	  current	  national	  
                                                
31	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	   Financing	   the	   EU	   budget:	   Report	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   own	   resources	  
system,	  op.	  cit.	  n°23.	  
32	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Methods	  and	  Procedure	  for	  Making	  
Available	  the	  Own	  Resource	  based	  on	  the	  Value	  Added	  Tax,	  op.	  cit.	  n°29.	  
33	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council,	  
and	   the	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  on	   the	   future	  of	  VAT	  Towards	  a	   simpler,	  more	   robust	  and	  
efficient	  VAT	  system	  tailored	  to	  the	  single	  market,	  COM(2011)	  851	  final,	  Brussels,	  6	  December	  2011.	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VAT	  exemptions	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  the	  use	  of	  reduced	  rates	  would	  still	  lead	  to	  important	  
distortions	  of	  competition.34	  	  
	  
The	   VAT’s	   vertical	   equity	   or	   “ability	   to	   pay”	   principle	   among	   citizens	   would	   not	   really	  
change	  with	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource.	  VAT	  is	  a	  form	  of	  consumption	  tax	  and	  has	  a	  very	  large	  
base.	  VAT	  affects	  all	  consumers	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  It	   is	  often	  considered	  as	  a	  regressive	  tax,	  
meaning	   that	   the	   poor	   participate	   more,	   as	   a	   percentage	   of	   its	   income,	   than	   the	   rich.	  
However,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  wealthy	  citizens	  pay	  more	  in	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  consume	  
more.	   In	  order	  to	  alleviate	  the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  the	  tax,	  reduced	  or	  zero	  rates	  on	  basic	  
consumer	  goods	  and	  services	  are	  applied.	  However,	  the	  tax-­‐base	  of	  the	  new	  system	  will	  not	  
take	  into	  account	  the	  reduced	  and	  zero	  rated	  supplies	  but	  only	  the	  standard	  rated	  supplies.	  	  
	  
Horizontal	   equity	   among	   citizens	   in	   different	   Member	   States	   will	   be	   improved.	   In	   the	  
current	  system,	  the	  contributions	  of	  the	  citizens	  to	  the	  EU	  budget	  based	  on	  the	  VAT	  resource	  
differ	  according	  to	  the	  country	   in	  which	  they	  reside.35	  The	  national	  differences	   in	  the	  zero,	  
reduced,	  and	  standard	  rates	  demonstrate	   the	  non-­‐harmonisation	  of	   the	  single	  market	  and	  
the	  current	  need	  for	  compensations.	  However,	  with	  the	  new	  system,	  all	  the	  EU	  citizens	  that	  
buy	   standard	   rated	   supplies	   included	   in	   the	   harmonised	   percentage	   will	   automatically	  
contribute	   for	   around	   the	   same	   amount	   to	   the	   EU	   budget.	   Moreover,	   once	   a	   supply	   is	  
comprised	   in	  the	  harmonised	  percentage	  of	  standard	  rated	  supplies,	   it	  will	  not	  be	  possible	  
for	   it	   to	   become	   a	   zero	   or	   reduced-­‐rated	   supply	   anymore.	   This	  would	   reduce	   slightly	   the	  
redistributive	  effects	  of	  the	  tax	  on	  EU	  consumers.	  	  
	  
The	  vertical	   fairness	  between	  Member	  States,	  characterised	  by	  their	  ability	   to	  pay,	  would	  
be	  slightly	  improved	  by	  the	  new	  VAT	  but	  would	  nevertheless	  remain	  an	  important	  problem.	  
Taking	  into	  account	  that	  the	  new	  VAT	  will	  be	  levied	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  harmonised	  percentage	  
of	  standard-­‐rated	  supplies,	  the	  current	  system	  with	  the	  capping	  of	  the	  VAT	  base	  at	  50%	  of	  
Member	   States’	   GNI	   and	   many	   other	   corrections	   and	   adjustments	   to	   obtain	   a	   purely	  
statistical	   VAT	   base	   would	   no	   longer	   be	   applied.	   However,	   as	   Gros	   and	   Micossi36	   have	  
already	  shown,	  the	  VAT	  yields	  as	  a	  share	  of	  GDP	  and	  the	  private	  consumption	  as	  a	  share	  of	  
GDP	  vary	  among	  Member	  States.	  In	  2010,	  the	  receipts	  from	  the	  VAT	  across	  the	  27	  Member	  
States	  ranged	  from	  5.5%	  (Spain)	  to	  9.9%	  (Denmark)	  of	  GDP37,	  while	  the	  VAT-­‐base	  expressed	  
as	   private	   consumption	   varied	   from	   37,2%	   (Luxembourg)	   to	   75.9%	   (Greece)	   of	   GDP.	   As	  
rightly	   explained	  by	  Begg	  et	   al38,	   there	   is	   a	   correlation	  between	   the	  VAT	   rate	   and	   the	   tax	  
income	  but	  it	  is	  far	  from	  linear.	  Moreover,	  the	  regressive	  nature	  of	  the	  VAT	  among	  Member	  
States	  can	  also	  be	  partially	  refuted	  by	  the	  relatively	  high	  VAT	  income	  in	  some	  of	  the	  richer	  
countries	   as	   well	   as	   among	   the	   poorer	   ones.	   All	   this	   leads	   to	   the	   observation	   that	   the	  
                                                
34	  Institute	  for	  Fiscal	  Studies	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  A	  Retrospective	  Evaluation	  of	  Elements	  of	  the	  EU	  VAT	  System,	  report	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  London,	  1	  December	  2011.	  
35	  I.	  Begg	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  op.	  cit.	  n°8.	  
36	  D.	  Gros	  and	  S.	  Micossi	  (2005),	  A	  Better	  Budget	  for	  the	  European	  Union:	  More	  Value	  for	  Money,	  More	  Money	  
for	  Value,	  CEPS	  Policy	  Brief	  No.	  66,	  February	  2005.	  	  
37	   Eurostat	   (2012),	  Taxation	   Trend	   in	   the	   European	  Union:	  Data	   for	   the	   European	  Union	  Member	   States	   and	  
Iceland	  and	  Norway,	  2012	  edition,	  Luxembourg:	  Publications	  Office	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  2012,	  p.	  186.	  
38	  I.	  Begg	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  op.	  cit.	  n°8,	  p.	  83.	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proposal	   of	   the	   Commission	   to	   transfer	   a	   share	   of	   a	   chargeable	   VAT-­‐base	   to	   the	   EU	   level	  
would	  also	  have	  an	  uneven	  incidence	  among	  Member	  States.	  Although	  the	  chargeable	  VAT-­‐
base	  would	  be	  relatively	  harmonised,	  the	  differences	  among	  Member	  States	  would	  remain	  
important.	  Therefore,	  one	  can	  wonder	  with	  Begg	  et	  al.39	  whether	  adjustments	  could	  not	  be	  
reintroduced	  in	  the	  future	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  fairness	  among	  Member	  States	  argument.	  
	  
As	   for	   horizontal	   fairness	   among	  Member	   States	   (i.e.	   the	   appropriability	  of	   revenue),	   the	  
new	  VAT	  system	  will	  not	   fundamentally	   change	   the	  current	   situation.	  The	  VAT	  applies	   the	  
“destination	  principle”,	  meaning	  that	  yields	  are	  raised	  in	  the	  Member	  State	  where	  the	  taxed	  
product	   is	  sold.	  This	  means	  that	  exports	  are	  exempt	  and	  that	   imports	  are	   indirectly	   taxed.	  
This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  substitution	  for	  tariffs	  within	  the	  customs	  union.	  The	  VAT	  can	  therefore	  
be	   considered	   as	   “an	   instrument	   of	   intra-­‐EU	   tax	   competition	   when	   used	   by	   one	   national	  
government”40.	  Moreover	   it	   can	   also	   be	   argued	   that	   the	  VAT	   paid	   by	   tourists	   on	   holidays	  
increases	   the	   receipts	   of	   the	   hosting	  Member	   States,	   while	   reducing	   the	   VAT	   receipts	   of	  
Member	   States	  where	   the	   tourists	   come	   from	   (the	   “Marbella	   effect”).41	   Compared	   to	   the	  
current	   system,	   the	   new	  VAT	  procedure	  will	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   reduced	   and	   zero-­‐
rated	  supplies	   in	   the	  calculations	  of	   the	   tax	  base	  anymore.	  Yet,	   it	   should	  not	  have	  a	  great	  
deal	  of	  influence	  on	  the	  horizontal	  fairness	  among	  Member	  States.	  
b.	  	  	  Political	  and	  administrative	  factors	  	  
	  
The	  new	  VAT	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  become	  a	  sufficient	  revenue	  source	  for	  the	  income	  side	  of	  
the	  EU	  budget	   as	   long	  as	   there	   is	   a	   residual	   resource	   such	  a	   the	  GNI-­‐based	   resource.	   The	  
Commission’s	  proposal	  argues	  for	  an	  important	  increase	  of	  the	  funds	  coming	  from	  the	  VAT-­‐
based	  resource.	  While	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  accounts	  for	  €	  14.5	  billion	  (11.1%	  of	  
total	  revenue),	  the	  minimum	  estimate	  of	  the	  new	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  in	  2020	  amounts	  to	  €	  
29.4	  billion	   (18.1%	  of	   total	   revenue).42	   In	  2009,	  VAT	  across	  all	   EU	  Member	  States	   raised	  €	  
784	  billion,	  or	  6.6%	  of	  the	  EU’s	  GDP,	  while	  the	  EU	  budget	  accounts	  for	  around	  1%	  of	  GDP.	  
The	   potential	   revenue	   of	   the	   new	   VAT	   resource	   will	   depend	   on	   the	   uniform	   percentage,	  
which	  has	  to	  be	  decided	  prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  new	  MFF.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  revenue	  stability	  of	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  should	  be	  guaranteed	   in	  the	  future.	  As	  the	  
revenue	  source	  grows	  together	  with	  the	  economic	  cycle,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  EU’s	  GNI	  will	  be	  
reflected	  in	  VAT	  yields.	  Although	  we	  live	  in	  times	  of	  financial	  crises,	  where	  economic	  growth	  
is	   no	   longer	   a	   certainty,	   an	   economic	   downturn	   will	   have	   less	   impact	   on	   VAT	   revenues	  
compared	  to	  other	  types	  of	  taxation.	  The	  VAT	  is	  more	  stable	  than	  either	  an	  aviation	  tax	  or	  a	  
financial	  transaction	  tax,	  which	  are	  more	  cyclical	  in	  their	  yield.	  This	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
low	  revenue	  elasticity	  of	  the	  consumption	  goods	  and	  services	  subject	  to	  the	  VAT	  (although	  in	  
general	   the	   EU’s	   standard-­‐rated	   supplies	   are	   more	   elastic	   than	   zero-­‐	   or	   reduced-­‐rated	  
                                                
39	  Ibidem,	  p.	  83.	  
40	  Ibidem,	  p.	  83.	  
41	  Ibidem,	  p.	  64.	  
42	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	   Decision	   on	   the	   System	   of	   Own	   Resources	   of	   the	  
European	  Union,	  op.	  cit.	  n°20.	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supplies).	  Moreover,	  the	  budget	  must	  be	  balanced,	  so	  even	  if	  the	  VAT	  resource	  goes	  down,	  it	  
would	  be	  compensated	  by	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  GNI	  resource.	  	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   other	   administrative	   considerations,	   the	   new	   VAT	   would	   bring	   important	  
advantages.	   The	   replacement	   of	   the	   current	   VAT-­‐based	   resource,	   considered	   as	   the	  most	  
controversial	   and	   complex	  own	   resource,	   by	   the	  new	  VAT	   resource	  would	   greatly	   simplify	  
the	   contributions	   to	   the	   EU	   budget.	   The	   VAT	   resource	   would	   be	   no	   longer	   levied	   on	   a	  
statistical	  tax-­‐base	  requiring	  complex	  calculations.	  Instead,	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  would	  be	  
calculated	  ex-­‐post	  by	  allocating	  1%	  of	  a	  partially	  harmonised	  VAT-­‐base	  to	  the	  EU	  level.	  The	  
uniform	   percentage	   of	   VAT	   receipts	   accruing	   from	   standard-­‐rated	   supplies	   would	   also	  
provide	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  predictability	  and	  certainty	  for	  Member	  States,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  valid	  
for	  the	  period	  of	  a	  MFF.	  It	  would	  probably	  also	  decrease	  the	  incidence	  of	  tax	  evasion	  caused	  
by	  horizontal	  tax	  competition,	  because	  the	  system	  would	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  manipulate.43	  
The	   simplification	   of	   the	   system	   should	   decrease	   administrative	   costs	   for	   national	   and	   EU	  
administrations.	  However,	  the	  Commission	  specifies	  that	  “savings	  would	  only	  be	  obtained	  if	  
there	  was	  no	  longer	  any	  need	  to	  calculate	  the	  uncapped	  VAT-­‐base	  for	  the	  UK	  correction.”44	  	  
	  
The	   link	   to	   EU	   policy	   objectives,	   which	   characterised	   genuine	   own	   resources,	   would	   be	  
more	  significant	  with	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource.	  Being	  a	  statistical	  construction,	  the	  VAT-­‐based	  
own	   resource	   only	   has	   a	   superficial	   link	   with	   the	   European	   VAT	   policy	   area.	   The	   current	  
differences	  in	  rates	  and	  coverage	  exemplify	  the	  incomplete	  internal	  market,	  although	  there	  
is	   a	   “passable	   degree	   of	   uniformity	   in	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   tax”.45	   Member	   States	   are	  
generally	  not	  in	  favour	  of	  harmonising	  the	  VAT	  for	  reasons	  of	  horizontal	  tax	  competition.46	  
According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   the	   new	  VAT	   resource	  would	   provide	   “new	   impetus	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  by	  reinforcing	  harmonisation	  of	  national	  VAT	  systems”	  
via	  a	  uniform	  percentage	  of	  standard-­‐rated	  supplies.47	  The	  new	  VAT	  resource	  will	  be	  directly	  
impacted	  by	  both	  the	  European	  and	  national	  VAT	  policies.	  The	  entitlement	  to	  the	  EU	  budget	  
will	  arise	  only	  when	  a	  Member	  State	  has	  actually	  collected	  the	  revenue	  from	  standard-­‐rated	  
supplies.	   This	  will	   create	  an	  automatic	   link	  between	   the	  national	  VAT	   receipts	   and	   the	  EU	  
budget.48	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  motivations	  for	  creating	  a	  new	  genuine	  own	  resource	  is	  increased	  visibility	  and	  
transparency	   for	   taxpayers.	  A	  new	  VAT-­‐based	   resource	  would	  be	  an	   ideal	  way	   to	  create	  a	  
link	   between	   the	   citizen	   and	   the	   EU	   and	   to	  make	   citizens	   aware	   of	   the	   costs	   of	   the	   EU.49	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   Theory	   of	   Differentiated	  
Integration”,	  in:	  West	  European	  Politics,	  24:4,	  pp.	  125–151.	  
47	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	   Decision	   on	   the	   System	   of	   Own	   Resources	   of	   the	  
European	  Union,	  op.	  cit.	  n°20.	  
48	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Regulation	  on	  the	  Methods	  and	  Procedure	  for	  Making	  
Available	  the	  Own	  Resource	  based	  on	  the	  Value	  Added	  Tax,	  op.	  cit.	  n°29,	  p.	  4.	  
49	  P.	  Cattoir	  (2009),	  Options	  for	  an	  EU	  Financing	  Reform,	  Notre	  Europe,	  Policy	  Paper	  No.	  38,	  December	  2009,	  p.	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Instead	  of	  a	  system	  based	  on	  very	  complex	  calculations,	  the	  Commission	  proposes	  a	  simple	  
system	  based	  on	  a	  direct	  transfer	  of	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  receipts	  of	  a	  relatively	  harmonised	  
VAT	  to	  the	  EU	  level.	  Electronic	  invoices	  could	  show	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  VAT	  that	  goes	  to	  
the	  EU	  revenue	  side,	  so	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  more	  direct	  and	  more	  apparent	  link	  between	  
the	   citizens	   and	   the	   EU.	   Increased	   visibility	   would	   pave	   the	   way	   for	   more	   political	  
accountability	  of	  the	  expenditure	  items.	  	  
	  
The	  reform	  would	  clearly	  improve	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  level	  of	  government.	  The	  current	  
VAT	  resource	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  genuine	  own	  resource	  insofar	  as	  the	  establishment	  
of	   its	   base	   and	   its	   rates	   remain	  Member	   States	   decisions.50	  Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	  
equity	   among	   Member	   States,	   the	   VAT	   resource	   is	   subject	   to	   various	   corrections	   and	  
adjustments	   that	  make	   it	   comparable	   to	  a	  national	   contribution.	   In	  contrast,	   the	  new	  VAT	  
would	  be	  genuinely	  linked	  to	  the	  EU	  level	  of	  government.	  Although	  revenue	  collection	  would	  
still	   exclusively	   rely	   on	   Member	   States	   administrations,	   an	   automatic	   link	   between	   the	  
national	   receipts	   stemming	   from	  a	  harmonised	  percentage	  of	   standard-­‐rated	   supplies	   and	  
the	  EU	  budget	  would	  be	  created.	  Therefore	  the	  VAT	  rates	  would	  still	  remain	  a	  Member	  State	  
decision	  but	  the	  tax	  base	  retained	  for	  the	  transfer	  towards	  the	  EU	  level	  would	  be	  based	  on	  a	  
harmonised	  percentage	  of	  standard-­‐rated	  supplies.	  Given	  the	  differences	  between	  national	  
VAT	  systems,	  the	  discussions	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  harmonisation	  of	  standard-­‐rated	  supplies	  to	  
establish	  the	  percentage	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  difficult.	  	  
c.	  Overall	  conclusions	  on	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  
The	  new	  VAT	  resource	  would	  not	  only	  bring	  many	  advantages	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐
based	  resource	  but	  it	  would	  also	  represent	  a	  step	  forward	  in	  the	  EU	  integration	  process.	  	  
	  
Under	  economic	  considerations,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  on	  Member	  States	  will	  
probably	  be	   limited	   relative	   to	   the	  system	  currently	   in	  place.	  The	  horizontal	  equity	  among	  
citizens	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   slightly	   enhanced,	   as	   they	  will	   all	   pay	   around	   the	   same	   for	   the	   EU	  
budget	  if	  they	  buy	  a	  standard-­‐rated	  supply	  submitted	  to	  the	  uniform	  percentage.	  However,	  
the	   new	   VAT	   resource	   would	   alter	  Member	   States’	   net	   balances,	   as	   most	   of	   the	   current	  
compensations	   would	   be	   abolished.	   Member	   States	   could	   thus	   potentially	   call	   for	   new	  
compensations	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  of	  vertical	  fairness.	  	  
	  
Under	  political	  and	  administrative	  considerations,	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  would	  bring	  about	  
many	  advantages	  justifying	  its	  status	  as	  a	  genuine	  own	  resource.	  The	  transfer	  of	  a	  share	  of	  
the	   receipts	   to	   the	   EU	   level	   from	   a	   virtually	   harmonised	   tax-­‐base	   composed	   of	   standard-­‐
rated	   supplies	  would	   create	  a	  genuine	   link	  between	   the	  national	  VAT	   systems	  and	   the	  EU	  
budget.	  This	  would	  provide	  new	  impetus	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  through	  
an	  increased	  harmonisation	  of	  national	  VAT	  systems.	  The	  new	  VAT	  would	  also	  enhance	  the	  
visibility	  and	  transparency	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  taxpayers.	  Moreover,	  the	  new	  VAT	  would	  improve	  
the	   sufficiency	   of	   revenue,	   simplify	   the	   current	   procedure	   and,	   hence,	   reduce	   the	  
administration	  costs.	  	  
                                                
50	  Although	  subject	  to	  some	  rules	  imposed	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	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In	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  MFF	  negotiations,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  new	  VAT	  will	  
be	  adopted.	  The	  Van	  Rompuy	  proposal	  has	  already	  postponed	  its	  implementation	  to	  January	  
2021	  at	   the	   latest.	  Although	   the	  new	  VAT	  meets	  many	  of	   the	  evaluation	  criteria,	  Member	  
States	  are	  sensitive	  to	   issues	  related	  to	  tax	  harmonisation	  as	  well	  as	   to	  their	  net	  balances.	  
The	  UK,	  for	  instance,	  is	  against	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  because	  it	  wants	  
to	  protect	  its	  rebate,	  which	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  procedure.51	  	  
	  
However,	   EU	   institutions	   and	   the	  Member	   States	   agree	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   that	   the	   current	  
VAT	  system	  should	  be	  abolished.	  According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  impact	  of	  eliminating	  the	  
VAT-­‐based	  own	  resource	  would	  not	  be	  significant.	  It	  would	  only	  slightly	  change	  the	  financing	  
shares	   of	   Member	   States.	   Therefore,	   the	   earlier	   the	   old	   VAT-­‐based	   resource	   would	   be	  
replaced	  with	  the	  new	  one,	  the	  better	  it	  would	  be.	  	  
3.1.2.	  	  A	  Financial	  Transaction	  Tax-­based	  resource	  
The	   most	   controversial	   part	   of	   the	   own	   resources	   proposal	   is	   undoubtedly	   the	   plan	   to	  
introduce	  a	   tax	  on	   financial	   transactions.	  There	   is	  a	   strong	   feeling	   that	   the	   financial	   sector	  
should	   contribute	   to	  bearing	   the	   costs	  of	   the	   crisis,	  mainly	  because	  of	   the	  extensive	   state	  
support	   it	  has	  received	  (39%	  of	  EU-­‐27	  GDP	   in	  2009),52	  but	  also	  because	  of	   the	  subsequent	  
budget	  cuts	  in	  nearly	  all	  EU	  Member	  States	  that	  have	  affected	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	  citizens.	  	  
	  
Such	   a	   Financial	   Transactions	   Tax	   (FTT)	   is	   not	   an	   entirely	   new	   idea.	   In	   the	   1970s,	   James	  
Tobin,	  a	  Nobel-­‐prizewinning	  US	  economist,	  first	  proposed	  “throwing	  sand	  in	  the	  wheels”	  of	  
the	   financial	   markets	   by	   imposing	   a	   tax	   on	   transactions.	   Since	   then,	   several	   countries	  
introduced	  Tobin	   style	   levies	  on	   capital	   transactions.53	  Over	   the	  years,	   the	   financial	   sector	  
has	   increased	  almost	  beyond	  imagination.	   Indeed,	  whereas	   in	  1990	  the	  annual	  turnover	  of	  
financial	  transactions	  amounted	  to	  15	  times	  the	  world	  GDP,	  by	  2008	  this	  had	  risen	  to	  around	  
70	  times	  global	  GDP.54	  	  
	  
The	  overarching	  goals	  of	   the	  FTT	  as	  proposed	  by	  the	  Commission	  are	  threefold.55	  Firstly,	  a	  
FTT	   could	  ensure	   that	   the	   financial	   sector	   contributes	  more	   fairly	   to	   the	   society	   given	   the	  
costs	  of	  the	  recent	  crisis	  and	  the	  under-­‐taxation	  of	  the	  sector	  due	  to	  its	  VAT	  exemption.	  It	  is	  
likely	  that	  the	  financial	  sector	  will	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future	  again	  require	  public	  money.	  By	  
putting	  in	  place	  a	  FTT,	  governments	  ensure	  that	  the	  financial	  sector	  itself	  contributes	  to	  such	  
bailouts.	   Secondly,	   it	  would	   “create	   appropriate	   disincentives	   for	   transactions	   that	   do	   not	  
enhance	   the	   efficiency	   of	   financial	   markets	   thereby	   complementing	   regulatory	   measures	  
                                                
51	  House	  of	  Lords	  (2012),	  The	  Multiannual	  Financial	  Framework	  from	  2014,	  25	  April	  2012.	  	  
52	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	  Executive	   Summary	   of	   the	   Impact	   Assessment	   accompanying	   the	   document	  
Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	   Directive	   on	   a	   common	   system	   of	   financial	   transaction	   tax	   and	   amending	   Directive	  
2008/7/EC,	  SEC	  (2011)	  1103	  final,	  Brussels,	  28	  September	  2011,	  p.	  2.	  	  
53	  E.g.	  UK	  stamp	  duties	  on	  share	  purchases	  and	  other	  taxes	  and	  levies	  imposed	  on	  the	  financial	  sector	  following	  
the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  
54	  S.	  Schulmeister	  (2009),	  A	  General	  Financial	  Transaction	  Tax,	  WIFO	  Working	  Papers	  344/2009,	  October	  2009.	  
55	   European	   Commission	   (2011),	   Council	   Directive	   on	   a	   common	   system	   of	   financial	   transaction	   tax	   and	  
amending	  Directive	  2008/7/EC,	  COM(2011)	  594	  final,	  Brussels,	  28.9.2011,	  p.	  2.	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aimed	   at	   avoiding	   future	   crises”.56	   Thirdly,	   regarding	   the	   increasing	   amount	   of	  
uncoordinated	   national	   tax	   measures	   on	   the	   financial	   sector	   being	   put	   in	   place	   in	   the	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  an	  EU-­‐wide	  FTT	  could	  avoid	  double	  taxation	  and	  distortions	  
of	  competition	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  financial	  services.	  
	  
However,	  several	  Member	  States	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  (with	  its	  large	  financial	  sector)	  and	  Sweden	  
have	  already	  challenged	  this	  third	  goal	  by	  stating	  clearly	  that	  they	  were	  against	  the	  adoption	  
of	   such	   a	   tax.	   Consequently,	   at	   the	   request	   of	   eleven	  Member	   States57,	   the	   Commission	  
proposed	   a	   Council	   Decision	   authorising	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   FTT	   under	   enhanced	  
cooperation.58	  Other	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands,	  are	  considering	  joining	  the	  club.	  In	  
his	  proposals	  on	  the	  MFF,	  European	  Council	  President	  Herman	  Van	  Rompuy	  maintained	  the	  
idea	  of	  enhanced	  cooperation	  to	  adopt	  a	  FTT.	  	  
	  
The	  Commission	  proposes	  an	  EU-­‐wide	  tax	  rate	  of	  0.1%	  on	  the	  exchange	  of	  bond	  and	  shares,	  
and	   of	   0.01%	   on	   derivative	   transactions	   between	   financial	   firms.	   Member	   States	   would	  
remain	   free	   to	   impose	   higher	   tax	   rates.	   The	   FTT	   would	   be	   imposed	   on	   all	   transactions	  
between	  financial	   institutions	  whether	  on	  the	  organised	  market	  or	  over	  the	  counter	  (OTC).	  
Transactions	  involving	  private	  households	  or	  SMEs	  would	  mostly	  escape	  this	  tax.59	  
	  
A	  FTT	  is	  likely	  to	  raise	  significant	  revenues	  from	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Under	  the	  Commission	  
and	  the	  European	  Council	  President	  proposals,	   two-­‐thirds	  of	   the	  amounts	  collected	  by	  the	  
participating	  Member	  States	  would	  be	  used	  as	  an	  own	  resource	  to	  finance	  the	  EU	  budget.	  
The	  GNI-­‐based	  resource	  of	  these	  Member	  States	  would	  be	  reduced	  correspondingly,	  leaving	  
a	  lesser	  burden	  on	  national	  treasuries.	  	  
	  
Although	  other	  options	  exist	  to	  tax	  the	  financial	  sector,	  such	  as	  a	  financial	  activities	  tax	  or	  a	  
bank	   levy,	   the	  present	  paper	  will	   refrain	   from	  analysing	  them	  and	  will	   focus	  on	  the	  option	  
retained	  by	  the	  Commission,	   i.e.	  the	  FTT.	  The	  latter	  will	  be	  assessed	  as	  a	  means	  to	  finance	  
the	  EU	  budget	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  criteria	  of	  table	  3.	  
a.	  Economic	  Considerations	  
	  
The	  economic	  efficiency	  of	  a	  FTT	  is	  subject	  to	  debate	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  financial	  crisis	  lay	  
bare	   the	   large	   systemic	   and	   contagion	   risks	   that	   are	   posed	   by	   financial	   transactions.	   The	  
desirability	   and	   sustainability	   of	   the	   rapid	   and	   disproportionate	   growth	   of	   the	   financial	  
sector	  compared	  to	   the	  real	  economy	  has	  been	  subject	   to	  strong	  doubts.	  A	  FTT	  cannot	  by	  
itself	   correct	   undesirable	   market	   behaviour	   and	   thereby	   stabilising	   financial	   markets.	  
However,	  it	  can	  contribute	  to	  it.	  	  	  
                                                
56	  Ibidem.	  
57	  Belgium,	  Germany,	  Estonia,	  Greece,	  Spain,	  France,	  Italy,	  Austria,	  Portugal,	  Slovenia	  and	  Slovakia.	  
58	  European	  Commission	  (2012),	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Decision	  authorising	  enhanced	  cooperation	  in	  the	  area	  
of	  financial	  transaction	  tax,	  COM	  (2012)	  631	  final/2,	  Brussels,	  October	  2012.	  
59	   E.g.	   house	   mortgages,	   bank	   borrowing	   by	   SMEs,	   contributions	   to	   insurance	   contracts,	   spot	   currency	  
exchange	   transactions,	   raising	  of	   capital	  by	  enterprises	  or	  public	  bodies,	   including	  public	  development	  banks	  
through	  the	  issuance	  of	  bonds	  and	  shares	  on	  the	  primary	  market.	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By	  means	  of	  what	   is	   called	  a	  Pigouvian	   tax,	   the	  government	   can	   tend	   to	   correct	  a	  market	  
activity	   that	   generates	   negative	   externalities.	   High	   frequency	   trading	   is	   believed	   to	   have	  
been	   a	   major	   market	   destabilising	   force.60	   A	   FTT	   would	   be	   directed	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   at	  
automated	   trading	   systems,	   and	  particularly	  high	   frequency	   trading.	   These	   systems	  use	   to	  
make	  very	  small	  margins,	  but	  on	  a	  very	  large	  volume	  of	  transactions.	  Therefore,	  even	  a	  small	  
FTT	  would	  increase	  transaction	  costs	  and	  thus	  discourage	  potential	  traders.	  By	  reducing	  the	  
volume	  of	  these	  high-­‐risk	  financial	  transactions,	  a	  FTT	  would	  internalise	  the	  costs	  to	  society	  
(in	   terms	   of	   systemic	   risk)	   into	   the	   price	   of	   financial	   transactions	   and	   thereby	   reducing	  
speculation.	   According	   to	   the	   Commission,	   a	   FTT	   “would	   make	   financial	   markets	   more	  
efficient,	   by	   steering	   them	   away	   from	   casino-­‐type	   trading	   to	  more	   stable	   activities	  which	  
support	  the	  real	  economy’’.61	  	  
	  
What	  remains	  unsure,	  however,	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  tax	  would	  discourage	  risky	  forms	  
of	  trading	  on	  the	  financial	  markets.	  A	  FTT	  could	  contribute	  to	  reduce	  incentives	  for	  excessive	  
risk-­‐taking	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   short-­‐term	   trading	   and	   highly	   leveraged	   derivative	   trading	  
creates	   systemic	   risks.62	   However,	   opponents	   of	   the	   FTT	   argue	   that	   by	   reducing	   trading	  
volume,	   a	   FTT	   can	   in	   fact	   “distort	   pricing,	   since	   individual	   transactions	   will	   cause	   greater	  
price	   swings	  and	   fluctuations”.63	  They	  also	   claim	   that	   transactions	  on	  which	   it	  would	  have	  
the	   biggest	   impact	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   riskiest64	   and	   that	   banks	   and	   other	   financial	  
institutions	  could	  use	  even	  riskier	  trading	  strategies	  to	  maintain	  their	  margins65.	  The	  FTT	   is	  
thus	   sometimes	   accused	   of	   being	   insufficiently	   targeted	   to	   reduce	   market-­‐distorting	  
speculation.	  However,	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  past,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  banking	  sector	  will	  
not	  become	  more	  risk	  averse	  because	  of	  a	  mere	  FTT.	  A	  FTT	  could	  play	  a	  significant	  stabilising	  
role	   if	   “financial	  alchemy”	  banks,	   such	  as	  Goldman	  Sachs,	  were	  guided	  by	  more	   long-­‐term	  
trading	  and	  fewer	  overnight	  repurchase	  agreements”.66	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Commission	  itself	  
recognises	   that	   regulatory	   measures	   more	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   sources	   of	   systemic	   risks	  
would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  deal	  with	  undesirable	  market	  behaviours.67	  	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  broadly	  recognised	  that	  a	  FTT	  would	  not	  reduce	  the	  excessive	  leverage	  created	  by	  
the	  different	  tax	  treatment	  of	  debt	  and	  equity.	  Asset	  bubbles	  are	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  caused	  by	  
excessive	   leverage,	   not	   excessive	   transaction	  per	   se.	   Therefore,	   the	   issue	  would	  be	  better	  
                                                
60	  In	  terms	  of	  exchange	  rates,	  commodity	  prices,	  interest	  rates	  and	  stock	  prices	  over	  the	  short	  term	  as	  well	  as	  
over	  the	   long	  term.	  “This	   is	  so	  because	  short-­‐term	  price	  runs,	  strengthened	  by	  the	  use	  of	  automated	  trading	  
systems,	   accumulate	   to	   long-­‐term	   trends,	   bull	   markets	   and	   bear	   markets”;	   see	   interview	   with	   Stephan	  
Schulmeister,	   FTT	   will	   Dampen	   Speculation,	   Euractiv,	   20	   July	   2011,	   available	   on:	  
http://www.euractiv.com/euro-­‐finance/economist-­‐ftt-­‐dampen-­‐speculation-­‐interview-­‐506656.	  
61	   European	   Commission	   (2012),	   Commission	   proposes	   green	   light	   for	   enhanced	   cooperation	   on	   financial	  
transactions	  tax,	  Press	  Release,	  Brussels,	  23	  October	  2012.	  
62	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°52,	  p.	  4-­‐5.	  
63	  T.	  Beck	  and	  H.	  Huizinga	   (2011),	  Taxing	  Banks	  —	  Here	  We	  Go	  Again!,	   25	  October	  2011,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/7129	  
64	   Ibidem;	   According	   to	   them,	   the	   FTT	   would	   not	   impact	   the	   riskiest	   forms	   of	   speculative	   trading:	   the	  
Collateralised	  Debt	  Obligation	  (CDO)	  and	  the	  Credit	  Default	  Swap	  (CDS)	  markets.	  	  
65	  De	  Nederlandsche	  Bank	  (2011),	  Financiële	  transactietaks	  in	  EU	  onwenselijk,	  DNB	  Bulletin,	  6	  February	  2012.	  	  
66	  M.	  Roe	  (2012),	  Tobin	  Trouble,	  Project	  Syndicate,	  17	  February	  2012.	  
67	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°52,	  p.	  5.	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addressed	  via	  regulatory	  measures	  that	  target	  leverage,	  such	  as	  higher	  margin	  and	  collateral	  
requirements.	  68	  	  
	  
A	  significant	  economic	  concern	  of	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  FTT	  is	  the	  risk	  of	  geographical	  relocation	  
of	   financial	   institutions	   to	  countries	  where	   they	  will	  not	  have	  to	  pay	   the	   tax.	   In	  Sweden,	  a	  
FTT	  was	   enacted	   in	   January	   1984	   and	   abolished	   in	   April	   1990	  mainly	   due	   to	   the	   banking	  
sector’s	  relocation	  to	  surrounding	  countries,	  especially	  the	  UK.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  the	  FTT	  
will	  most	   likely	   be	   adopted	   under	   enhanced	   cooperation,	   it	  would	   run	   the	   risk	   of	   causing	  
intra-­‐European	   relocation	   of	   financial	   activities	   from	   participating	   to	   non-­‐participating	  
Member	  States.	  	  	  
	  
To	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  relocation,	  the	  tax	  would	  apply	  to	  every	  transaction	  where	  one	  party	  
has	   its	   tax	   residence	  within	   any	   of	   the	   participating	  Member	   States.	  Under	   this	   residence	  
principle,	  transactions	  will	  be	  taxed	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  financial	  institution	  or	  trader	  that	  is	  based	  in	  
one	  of	  the	  participating	  countries	   is	   involved,	  even	   if	   the	  transaction	   is	  carried	  out	  outside	  
the	   FTT	   club.	   Therefore,	   if	   a	   participating	   country	   is	   trading	  with	   a	   financial	   counterparty	  
established	  in	  a	  non-­‐participating	  or	  third	  country,	  both	  parties	  to	  the	  transaction	  would	  pay	  
their	  share	  of	  the	  tax	  in	  the	  participating	  country	  of	  residence	  or	  deemed	  residence.	  That	  is	  
why	   even	   non-­‐participating	   countries,	   such	   as	   the	   UK,	   are	   preoccupied	   by	   the	   trans-­‐
boundary	  effects	  of	  the	  tax.	  They	  are	  equally	  concerned	  about	  the	  cascade	  effect	  of	  the	  FTT	  
under	  which	  some	  intermediate	  transactions	  are	  not	  exempt	  from	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  FTT.69	  
Therefore,	   by	   taxing	   some	   intermediate	   transactions,	   the	   effective	   rate	   of	   the	   FTT	   could	  
become	  higher	  than	  the	  one	  foreseen	  in	  the	  proposal.70	  Apart	  from	  the	  risk	  of	  relocation	  to	  
non-­‐participating	   or	   third	   countries,	   there	   is	   thus	   also	   the	   risk	   that	   foreign	   financial	  
institutions	  will	  not	  want	  to	  make	  new	  investments	  in	  the	  participating	  Member	  States.	  	  
	  
In	  order	   to	  offset	   the	   relocation	  effect,	   the	  end	  goal	  of	   the	  EU	   is	   to	  promote	  a	  FTT	  at	   the	  
global	   level.	   Some	   forms	   of	   FTT	   have	   already	   been	   successfully	   introduced	   in	   several	  G20	  
countries	  such	  as	  South	  Korea,	  Brazil,	   India,	  and	  South	  Africa.	  Although	  there	   is	  “high-­‐level	  
political	  support	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  taxes,	  including	  at	  successive	  G20	  meetings”,71	  
it	   is	   highly	  unlikely	   that	   this	  will	  materialise	   in	   the	  near	   future	  as	  even	  at	   the	  EU	   level,	   all	  
Member	  States	  do	  not	  all	  agree	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  FTT.	  	  
	  
In	   sum,	   the	  macroeconomic	   impact	  of	   a	   FTT	   is	  uncertain,	   as	   it	   depends	  on	   several	   factors	  
that	  are	  difficult	  to	  assess,	  such	  as	  the	  tax	  base,	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  FTT	  on	  the	  financing	  of	  new	  
investment,	  the	  risk	  of	  relocation	  and	  the	  mitigating	  effects	  from	  the	  design	  of	  the	  proposal.	  
The	   FTT	   is	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   small	   but	   non-­‐trivial	   effect	   on	   growth.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	  
negative	  effect	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  capital,	  as	  the	  taxed	  persons	  will	  try	  to	  pass	  the	  
                                                
68	  T.	  Matheson	   (2011),	  Taxing	  Financial	  Transactions:	   Issues	  and	  Evidence,	   IMF	  Working	  Paper,	  WP/11/54,	  p.	  
37.	  
69	  The	  Commission’s	  proposal	  foresees	  that	  intermediate	  transactions	  of	  parties	  that	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  another	  
party	  are	  exempt	  from	  paying	  the	  tax.	  
70	  M.	  Bijlsma,	  M.	   Lever,	   J.	  Anthony	  and	  G.	  Zwart	   (2011),	  An	  Evaluation	  of	   the	  Financial	   Transaction	  Tax,	  CPB	  
Background	  Document,	  21	  December	  2011,	  p.	  9.	  
71	  I.	  Begg	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°26,	  p.	  14.	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tax	   through	   to	   their	   clients,	   and	   which	   then	   works	   as	   a	   financing	   constraint	   for	   new	  
investment.72	  According	   to	   the	   last	   assumptions	  of	   the	  Commission,	   the	  estimation	  of	   the	  
possible	   deviation	   of	   GDP	   was	   established	   at	   -­‐0,28%	   in	   the	   long	   run.73	   	   This	   means	   that	  
(when	  assuming	  in	  the	  baseline	  an	  annual	  growth	  of	  1.5%)	  in	  2050,	  instead	  of	  being	  81.4%	  
above	  today’s	  level,	  the	  European	  GDP	  would	  be	  81.1%	  above	  today’s	  level.	  However,	  in	  the	  
long-­‐term,	   a	   FTT	   could	   reduce	   undesirable	   risk-­‐taking	   behaviour,	   and	   therefore	   the	  
probability	   of	   future	   financial	   crises.	   These	   positive	   effects	   on	   future	   growth	   potentially	  
outweigh	   the	   negative	   effects,	   although	   estimates	   crucially	   depend	   on	   economic	  
assumptions.74	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  criterion	  of	  vertical	  equity	  among	  citizens,	  i.e.	  the	  ability	  to	  pay,	  the	  FTT	  has	  a	  
progressive	  distributional	  effect.	  This	   implies	  that	   its	   impact	   increases	  proportionately	  with	  
revenue	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  higher	  revenue	  groups	  benefit	  more	  from	  the	  services	  provided	  
by	   the	   financial	   sector.	   Private	  households	  or	   SMEs	   that	  hardly	   invest	   in	   financial	  markets	  
will	   thus	   mostly	   escape	   this	   tax.	   As	   previously	   said,	   by	   introducing	   a	   FTT,	   one	   of	   the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  is	  “to	  ensure	  that	  financial	  institutions	  make	  a	  fair	  
contribution	  to	  covering	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  recent	  crisis	  and	  to	  ensure	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  with	  
other	  sectors	  from	  a	  taxation	  point	  of	  view”.75	  Herein	  lie	  two	  points	  of	  attention.	  Firstly,	  will	  
the	  financial	  sector	  not	  just	  pass	  on	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  FTT?	  Banks	  and	  pension	  funds	  argue	  that	  
the	   burden	  may	   eventually	   have	   to	   be	   passed	   on	   to	   consumers	   in	   order	   for	   the	   financial	  
sector	  to	  maintain	  its	  margins.76	  Yet,	  they	  will	  only	  partly	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  vast	  majority	  
of	   the	   tax	   will	   be	   collected	   from	   short-­‐term	   trading	   with	   high	   leverage,	   and	   these	   are	  
predominantly	   conducted	   by	   hedge	   funds	   that	   are	   involved	   in	   high-­‐frequency	   trading,	  
investment	   banks	   and	   amateur	   traders,	   rather	   than	   “normal”	   consumers.77	   Pension	   funds	  
and	   insurance	   companies	   will	   pay	   much	   less	   than	   short-­‐term	   speculators.78	   Even	   if	   they	  
wanted	   to,	   investment	  banks	   such	  as	  Morgan	  Stanley	  cannot	  pass	  on	   the	  bill	   to	   individual	  
citizens.	   Secondly,	   the	   Commission	   argues	   that	   the	   financial	   sector	   is	   under-­‐taxed	   on	   the	  
whole,	  because	  it	   is	  exempt	  from	  VAT	  taxation.	  Introducing	  a	  tax	  on	  the	  financial	  sector	  to	  
help	   support	   the	   EU	   and	   national	   budgets	   would	   hence	   seem	   an	   “equitable”	   source	   of	  
revenue.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  principle	  of	  horizontal	  equity	  among	  citizens,	  individuals	  in	  similar	  circumstances	  
should	  be	  treated	  equally.	  Yet,	  if	  the	  tax	  is	  introduced	  under	  enhanced	  cooperation	  in	  some	  
countries,	   then	   the	   citizens	   of	   the	   participating	   countries	   would	   be	   treated	   differently	   in	  
similar	  circumstances	  than	  the	  citizens	   in	  the	  non	  participating	  countries.	  However,	  among	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  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°52,	  p.	  6.	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  European	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  (2012),	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  –	  Macroeconomic	  Impacts,	  n.d.,	  available	  on	  :	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74	   S.	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  and	  A.	  Persaud	   (2011),	  Financial	   Transaction	  Taxes,	   study	  commissioned	  by	   the	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  p.	  2.	  
75	  European	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  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°58,	  p.	  2.	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  C.	  Nederhof	  (2011),	  Bankenbelasting	  pakt	  banken	  driedubbel,	  Het	  Financieele	  Dagblad,	  2	  February	  2012.	  	  
77	  S.	  Schulmeister	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°60.	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  S.	  Griffith-­‐Jones	  and	  A.	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  (2011),	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  cit.	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  p.	  13.	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the	  citizens	  of	  the	  participating	  countries,	  horizontal	  equity	  would	  increase	  relative	  to	  purely	  
national	  taxes.	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   vertical	   fairness	   between	  Member	   States,	   the	   tax	   incidence	   is	   mainly	   a	  
derivative	  of	  the	  progressive	  distributional	  effect.	  Member	  States	  with	  a	  high	  GNI	  per	  capita	  
will	   pay	   relatively	   more,	   because	   citizens	   that	   have	   higher	   savings	   will	   contribute	   more.	  
However,	  if	  a	  Member	  State’s	  share	  of	  the	  EU	  financial	  sector	  is	  larger	  than	  its	  share	  of	  EU	  
GDP,	  it	  would	  pay	  relatively	  more	  to	  the	  EU	  budget	  with	  the	  new	  FTT	  resource	  than	  with	  the	  
GNI	  resource	  in	  the	  current	  system.	  This	  might	  lead	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  juste	  retour.	  
	  
Finally,	   the	  horizontal	   fairness	   among	  Member	   States,	   i.e.	  whether	   tax	   collection	   reflects	  
the	  true	  tax	   incidence,	   raises	   two	   important	   issues.	  Firstly,	  a	  FTT	  adopted	  under	  enhanced	  
cooperation	   would	   not	   contribute	   to	   horizontal	   equity	   between	   Member	   States,	   as	   the	  
financial	  sector	  would	  be	  treated	  differently	  between	  the	  participating	  and	  non-­‐participating	  
Member	   States.	   This	   means	   running	   the	   risk	   of	   intra-­‐EU	   relocation	   of	   businesses	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  a	  functioning	  internal	  market.	  The	  Commission	  is	  well	  aware	  of	  this	  danger.	  This	  
is	  why	   it	   stated	   that,	   “given	   the	  extremely	  high	  mobility	  of	  most	  of	   the	   transactions	   to	  be	  
potentially	   taxed,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   avoid	   distortions	   caused	   by	   tax	   rules	   conceived	   by	  
Member	   States	   acting	   unilaterally.	   Indeed,	   a	   fragmentation	   of	   financial	   markets	   across	  
activities	  and	  across	  borders	  can	  only	  be	  avoided	  (…)	  through	  action	  at	  the	  EU	  level”.79	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  among	  the	  countries	  participating	  to	  the	  enhanced	  cooperation,	  horizontal	  
equity	  would	   increase.	   Secondly,	   participating	  Member	   States	  with	   large	   financial	   centres	  
such	  as	  Frankfurt	  and	  Paris	  would	  evidently	  collect	  the	  highest	  yields.	  However,	  the	  technical	  
design	  of	  the	  tax	  would	  help	  with	  mitigating	  this	  effect.	  By	  using	  the	  residence	  principle	  the	  
degree	  of	  concentration	  of	  the	  tax	  revenue	  should	  be	  lower	  as	  the	  geographical	  distribution	  
will	   depend	   on	   the	   place	   of	   establishment	   of	   the	   financial	   actors,	   independent	   from	   the	  
location	  of	  the	  transactions.	  Therefore,	  non-­‐participating	  or	  third	  countries	  that	  trade	  in	  the	  
participating	  markets	  will	  also	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  FTT.	  
b.	  	  Political	  and	  administrative	  factors	  
A	  FTT	  could	  raise	  sufficient	   revenue	  to	  cover	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  EU	  budget	  but	  additional	  
revenue	  sources	  would	  still	  be	  necessary.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  real	  revenue	  
potential,	   given	   the	   number	   of	   unknown	   variables	   and	   assumptions	   in	   the	   estimations.	  
According	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  FTT	  could	  raise	  up	  to	  €	  81	  billion	  per	  year	  in	  2020,	  with	  €	  
54.2	  billion	  that	  could	  be	  granted	  to	  the	  EU	  budget,	   i.e.	  around	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  annual	  EU	  
budget.80	  If	  these	  figures	  can	  give	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  important	  revenue	  potential	  of	  a	  FTT,	  they	  
are	  however	  no	  longer	  up	  to	  date	  as	  not	  all	  Member	  States	  will	  join	  a	  FTT.	  	  Although	  the	  11	  
participating	  countries	  have	  not	  yet	  agreed	  on	  a	  common	  approach	  to	  the	  taxation,	  Oxfam	  
                                                
79	  European	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  (2011),	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Directive	  on	  a	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estimates	   that	   it	   could	   generate	   about	   €37	   billion	   per	   year81,	   while	   the	   French	   European	  
Affairs	  Minister	  reckons	  that	  it	  could	  raise	  more	  than	  €10	  billion	  per	  year82.	  
	  
The	  ability	  of	  a	  FTT	  to	  raise	  stable	  revenue	  for	  the	  EU	  budget	  over	  time	  is	  subject	  to	  doubts.	  
Here	  too,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  assess	  how	  the	  variables	  -­‐	  such	  as	  the	  economic	  cycles,	  the	  financial	  
sector’s	  possible	  relocation	  from	  the	  EU	  to	  third	  countries	  and	  the	  missed	  investments	  from	  
companies	   that	   choose	   to	   move	   their	   headquarters	   to	   non-­‐EU	   countries	   -­‐	   will	   affect	   the	  
stability	  of	  the	  resource	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  	  
	  
The	  administrative	  considerations	  mainly	  focus	  on	  the	  collection	  costs	  of	  the	  tax.	  As	  a	  FTT	  
would	  be	  a	  new	  system,	  its	  implementation	  would	  require	  collection	  costs.	  However,	  these	  
costs	  should	  not	  be	  excessive,	  as	  most	  transactions	  are	  carried	  out	  electronically	  and	  the	  tax	  
can	  be	  collected	  electronically	  and	  at	  the	  source.	  If	  existing	  market	  infrastructures,	  such	  as	  
trading	  platforms,	  trade	  repositories	  or	  clearing	  houses,	  can	  be	  used	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner,	  
a	  FTT	  could	  be	  collected	  at	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  revenue	  raised.83	  However,	  concerns	  have	  been	  
raised	   that	   the	   tax	  might	  be	  circumvented	   to	  a	   certain	  extent.84	  A	  number	  of	  anti-­‐evasion	  
measures	   and	   administrative	   cooperation	   both	   at	   national	   and	   European	   level	   would	  
therefore	  be	  needed	  to	  ensure	  a	  successful	  implementation	  of	  the	  tax.	  	  	  
	  
The	  FTT	  has	  a	  direct	   link	  to	  EU	  policy	  objectives.	  Since	  the	   financial	  crisis	  erupted,	   the	  EU	  
has	  been	  trying	  to	  reform	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  future	  crises.	  The	  
FTT	  fits	   into	  this	  objective.	  Furthermore,	   in	   its	  FTT	  proposal,	   the	  Commission	  speaks	  about	  
the	  goal	  “to	  avoid	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  financial	  services,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  
the	   increasing	   number	   of	   uncoordinated	   national	   tax	   measures	   being	   put	   in	   place”.85	   As	  
discussed	  above,	  a	  tendency	  exists	  to	  under-­‐tax	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  more	  
investment.	  For	   instance,	   Ireland	  has	  attracted	  a	   lot	  of	   foreign	  direct	   investment	   in	   recent	  
decades	  because	  of	  its	  tax	  climate.	  This	  leads	  to	  competition	  among	  Member	  States	  within	  
the	   EU,	   a	   situation	   known	   as	   horizontal	   tax	   competition.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   FTT	   will	   most	  
probably	   be	   adopted	   under	   enhanced	   cooperation	   will	   affect	   the	   objective	   to	   avoid	  
fragmentation	  in	  the	  internal	  market.	  Nevertheless,	  even	  if	  implemented	  by	  some	  Member	  
States,	   a	   FTT	  would	   lead	   to	  more	  mutual	   supervision	   of	   the	   financial	   sector.	   A	   broad	   FTT	  
would	  provide	  a	  certain	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  financial	  institutions	  and	  businesses,	  as	  well	  as	  
a	  coordinated	  approach	  that	  would	  reduce	  tax	  evasion.	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The	  answer	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  FTT’s	  visibility	  and	  transparency	  to	  taxpayers	  is	  twofold.	  On	  
the	  one	  hand,	  a	  FTT	  is	  not	  really	  visible	  because	  it	  targets	  financial	  institutions,	  not	  citizens.	  
Its	   visibility	   to	   “the	  man	   in	   the	   street”	   is	   therefore	   limited.	   At	   the	  most,	   amateur	   traders	  
would	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  tax.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  people	  who	  invest	  their	  savings	  in	  financial	  
markets	  would	  be	  affected,	  especially	   if	  financial	  markets	  transfer	  the	  costs	  to	  their	  clients	  
as	  many	  have	  suggested	  that	  they	  will	  do.	  Yet,	  if	  people	  use	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  banks	  or	  
pension	  funds,	  they	  will	  probably	  not	  be	  aware	  that	  they	  are	  contributing.	  	  
	  
The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  EU	  level	  of	  government	  would	  be	  increased.	  Although,	  the	  FTT	  would	  
be	   collected	   by	   the	  Member	   States	   and	   transferred	   to	   the	   EU,	   a	   FTT	   resource	   would	   be	  
considered	  as	  genuinely	  owned	  by	  the	  EU.	  The	  fact	  that	  Member	  States	  would	  collect	  the	  tax	  
revenues	   would	   still	   allow	   them	   to	   calculate	   their	   net	   contributions.	   However,	   the	   cross-­‐
boundary	   nature	   of	   the	   FTT	   resource	   would	   make	   the	   calculations	   inaccurate	   and	   much	  
more	   difficult	   to	   establish.	  Moreover,	   the	   uniform	   rates	   of	   the	   FTT	   and	   the	   share	   of	   the	  
receipts	  that	  would	  go	  to	  the	  EU	  budget	  would	  be	  decided	  at	  the	  EU	  level.	  	  
c.	  Overall	  conclusions	  on	  a	  FTT	  
In	   the	  end,	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  FTT	  under	  enhanced	  cooperation	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  political	  
choice.	  Given	  that	  governments	  and	  European	  citizens	  have	  principally	  borne	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  
economic	  crisis,	  opinion	  polls	  show	  that	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  European	  citizens	  is	  in	  favour	  
of	   taxing	   the	   financial	   sector.	   The	   tax	   would	   raise	   important	   revenue,	   an	   advantage	   for	  
national	   governments	   that	   have	   a	   hard	   time	   balancing	   their	   budgets.	   The	   question	   is	  
whether	   the	   use	   of	   a	   share	   of	   this	   revenue	   to	   finance	   the	   EU	   budget	   will	   raise	   enough	  
political	  clout.	  	  	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  economic	  considerations,	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  FTT	  will	  
depend	  on	  several	  factors	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  assess;	  such	  as	  the	  tax	  base,	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  
FTT	  on	  the	  financing	  of	  new	  investment,	  the	  risk	  of	  relocation	  and	  the	  FTT’s	  ability	  to	  reduce	  
the	   risk	   of	   financial	   crises.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   FTT	   would	   most	   likely	   reduce	   excessive	   and	  
specific	   risk-­‐taking,	   especially	   frequent	   short-­‐term	   transactions	   by	   automated	   trading.	   The	  
distributional	  implications	  of	  a	  FTT	  in	  terms	  of	  vertical	  equity	  are	  typically	  progressive	  in	  that	  
it	   is	   taking	  more	   from	   those	  who	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   pay.	   However,	   there	   are	   two	  major	  
issues	   in	   terms	   of	   horizontal	   equity.	   Not	   only	   much	   of	   the	   revenue	   would	   appear	   to	   be	  
generated	   by	   participating	   countries	   hosting	   big	   financial	   centres,	   but	   also	   a	   FTT	   adopted	  
under	  enhanced	  cooperation	  would	  keep	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  for	  financial	  
services.	  Different	  types	  of	  taxes	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  the	  EU	  would	  bring	  about	  more	  
tax	  competition	  and	  a	  risk	  of	  relocation.	  It	  remains	  that	  a	  FTT	  under	  enhanced	  cooperation	  is	  
better	   than	   nothing	   as	   it	   would	   harmonize	   to	   some	   extent	   financial	   taxation	   in	   the	  
participating	  Member	   States.	   Moreover	   the	   risk	   of	   relocation	   would	   be	   mitigated	   by	   the	  
residence	  principle	  according	  to	  which,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  where	  a	  transaction	  is	  carried	  out	  
but	  who	  the	  transaction	  partners	  are.	  	  	  
	  
Under	   administrative	   and	   political	   considerations,	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   FTT	   is	   globally	  
positive,	   though	   it	   remains	   difficult	   to	   determine	   how	   difficult	   it	   would	   be	   to	   implement	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under	   enhanced	   cooperation.	   Although	   the	   tax	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   guarantee	   the	  
sufficiency	  and	  stability	  of	  revenue	  due	  to	  the	   influence	  of	  various	  economic	   factors	  on	   its	  
yields,	   its	  revenue	  potential	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  Moreover,	  the	  FTT	  would	  most	  
certainly	  be	  complemented	  with	  the	  GNI	  based	  resource,	  which	  would	  insure	  the	  balance	  of	  
the	  EU	  budget.	  The	  FTT	  should	  also	  not	  bring	  about	  important	  collection	  costs	  if	  good	  use	  is	  
made	   of	   existing	  market	   infrastructures.	   Finally,	   the	   cross-­‐boundary	   nature	   of	   the	   FTT,	   its	  
direct	   link	   to	   EU	   policy	   objectives,	   and	   its	   relative	   visibility	   and	   accountability	   towards	  
citizens	  would	  make	  it	  what	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  genuine	  own	  resource	  of	  the	  EU.	  	  	  
3.2.    Tackling the correction mechanisms  
Many	  of	   the	  main	  encounters	  on	   the	   financing	  of	   the	  EU	  budget	  are	  about	   the	  correction	  
mechanisms.	  This	  question	  represents	  thus	  a	  key	  element	  of	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  EU	  financing	  
system	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   simplicity,	   transparency	   and	   equity	   between	  
Member	  States.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recall	  that	  equity	  cannot	  be	  measured	  only	  
in	  terms	  of	  Member	  States’	  net	  budgetary	  balances.	  The	  calculations	  of	  net	  balances	  do	  not	  
take	   into	  account	   the	  mutual	  benefits	  of	   the	  EU	  budget	   specifically	  and	   the	  EU	  process	  of	  
integration	  in	  general.	  However,	  fair	  burden	  sharing	  between	  Member	  States	  with	  respect	  to	  
net	   balances	   represents	   an	   essential	   component	   of	   the	   final	   political	   agreement	   on	   the	  
MFF.86	  
	  
The	   Commission	   proposed	   a	   radical	   reform	   of	   the	   system	   of	   corrections	   respecting	   the	  
principle	  of	  the	  1984	  Fontainebleau	  European	  Council	  that	  “any	  Member	  State	  sustaining	  a	  
budgetary	  burden	  which	  is	  excessive	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  relative	  prosperity	  may	  benefit	  from	  a	  
correction	  at	  the	  appropriate	  time”.	  According	  to	  this	  principle,	  equity	  requires	  that	  Member	  
States	  do	  not	  sustain	  an	  “excessive”	  net	  balance	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  capacity	  to	  contribute	  as	  
reflected	  by	   their	   relative	  prosperity.	   Therefore,	   correction	  mechanisms	   should	   reflect	   the	  
ability	   to	   pay	   of	   Member	   States	   and	   be	   limited	   to	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   MFF.	   Indeed,	  
corrections	   are	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   expenditure,	   which	   changes	   from	   one	  
financial	  framework	  to	  another.	  	  	  
	  
This	  principle	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  consecutive	  Own	  Resource	  Decisions.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  
the	  objective	  conditions	  underpinning	  the	  correction	  mechanisms	  have	  changed	  significantly	  
over	  time	  but	  this	  evolution	  is	  not	  correctly	  applied	  in	  the	  current	  corrections	  system.	  This	  is	  
particularly	   the	  case	  of	   the	  British	   rebate,	  which	  has	  no	  expiration	  date.	  At	   the	   time	  of	   its	  
introduction	   the	   UK	   correction	   offered	   a	   solution	   to	   what	   was	   obviously	   an	   inequitable	  
situation	  whereby	  one	  of	   the	  main	   contributors	   to	   the	  EU	  budget	  was	  one	  of	   the	  poorest	  
Member	  States.	  However,	  the	  circumstances	  leading	  to	  this	  particular	  situation	  have	  clearly	  
evolved	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  rebate	  in	  1984,	  and	  the	  net	  contribution	  of	  the	  UK	  with	  
respect	  to	  its	  relative	  wealth	  is	  no	  more	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  budgetary	  burden	  of	  other	  
Member	  States.	  The	  current	  system	  of	  corrections	  is	  therefore	  not	  equitable.	  Some	  Member	  
States	   benefitting	   from	   corrections	   have	   a	  more	   favourable	   net	   position	   relative	   to	   other	  
                                                
86	  Cyprus	  Presidency	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  EU,	  Revenue	  side	  –	  Own	  resources	  system	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  –	  
Corrections,	  Presidency	  Issues	  Paper	  –	  Multiannual	  Financial	  Framework	  2014-­‐2020,	  22	  October	  2012,	  p.	  3.	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Member	   States	   not	   benefitting	   from	   corrections	   with	   a	   similar	   or	   even	   lower	   level	   of	  
prosperity.87	  Consequently,	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  corrections	  in	  the	  current	  MFF	  is	  too	  high.	  	  
	  
The	  description	  of	   the	  current	  system	  of	  corrections	  made	   in	  section	  1.2	  also	  showed	  that	  
this	   system	   is	   complex	   and	   non-­‐transparent.	   This	   is	   particularly	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
method	  for	  calculating	  the	  British	  rebate	  and	  the	  corrections	  granted	  to	  Germany,	  Sweden,	  
Austria	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  is	  based	  on	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  rates	  of	  call	  on	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐
based	  resource.	  Therefore,	  the	  prolongation	  of	  the	  current	  system	  would	  not	  be	  feasible	  if	  
the	  proposal	  of	  the	  Commission	  to	  abolish	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  is	  adopted.	  	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   make	   the	   system	   more	   simple,	   transparent	   and	   equitable,	   the	   Commission	  
proposes	  a	  lump-­‐sums	  system	  that	  should	  replace	  all	  current	  existing	  correction	  mechanisms	  
as	   of	   1	  January	  2014.	   The	   countries	   with	   an	   “excessive”	   budgetary	   burden	   would	   receive	  
corrections	   in	   the	   form	   of	   lump	   sum	   gross	   reductions	   in	   annual	   GNI-­‐based	   contributions	  
during	   the	   period	   2014-­‐2020.	   All	   Member	   States	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   GNI-­‐shares	   would	  
finance	  these	  lump	  sums.	  This	  new	  system	  would	  be	  simple	  and	  transparent,	  thus	  making	  it	  
more	  open	  to	  public	  and	  parliamentary	  scrutiny.88	  While	  it	  would	  apply	  only	  for	  the	  period	  
of	   the	  MFF,	   it	   would	   also	   be	  more	   equitable	   and	   predictable	   than	   the	   current	   correction	  
mechanisms.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  countries	  that	  could	  face	  an	  “excessive”	  budgetary	  burden	  for	  the	  
next	   MFF,	   the	   Commission	   related	   the	   Member	   States’	   net	   contributions	   (operating	   net	  
budgetary	  balances)	  to	  their	  relative	  national	  prosperity	  (GNI	  per	  capita	  in	  purchasing	  power	  
standards).	  According	  to	  this	  method,	  four	  Member	  States	  -­‐	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Germany,	  
the	  Netherlands	  and	  Sweden	  -­‐	  would	  face	  an	  excessive	  budgetary	  burden.	  However,	  some	  
countries,	  including	  the	  UK,	  question	  the	  figures	  used	  by	  the	  Commission	  to	  determine	  the	  
rankings	   of	   relative	   national	   prosperity	   and	   net	   budgetary	   balances.89	   For	   instance,	   with	  
respect	   to	   relative	   prosperity,	   the	   UK	   disputes,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   Commission	  
measures	   the	  Member	   States’	   levels	   of	   prosperity	   in	   GNI	   per	   capita	   in	   purchasing	   power	  
standards.	   According	   to	   the	   UK,	   since	   the	   contributions	   to	   the	   EU	   budget	   “are	   made	   in	  
nominal	  terms	  (i.e.	  Euro)	  at	  market	  exchange	  rate,	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  look	  at	  GNI	  per	  
capita	   levels	   calculated	   on	   nominal	   exchange	   rates”.90	   This	   method	   would	   rank	   the	   UK	  
eleventh	  instead	  of	  ninth	  (with	  the	  Commission’s	  method)	  out	  of	  twelve	  Member	  States	  on	  
relative	  prosperity.	  	  
	  
The	   United	   Kingdom,	   Germany,	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   Sweden	   would	   therefore	   receive	  
temporary	   corrections	   under	   the	   lump	   sums	   system	   for	   the	   next	  MFF.	   However,	   the	   Van	  
Rompuy	  proposal	  has	  already	  modified	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  by	  maintaining	  the	  British	  
rebate	   and	   changing	   the	   figures	   of	   the	   lump	   sums	   system	   for	   the	   three	   other	   countries.	  
Therefore,	  while	   the	  Commission	  proposed	   the	   following	   tentative	   figures:	   €2.5	  billion	   for	  
                                                
87	  Ibidem,	  p.	  4.	  
88	  European	  Commission	  (2011),	  op.	  cit.	  n°23.	  
89	  Letter	  from	  the	  UK	  Representation	  to	  the	  EU	  Brussels	  (Sir	  Jon	  Cunliffe)	  to	  the	  European	  Commission	  (Hervé	  
Jouanjean),	  21	  November	  2012.	  
90	  Ibidem.	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Germany,	  €1.05	  billion	  for	  the	  Netherlands,	  €350	  million	  for	  Sweden	  and	  €3.6	  billion	  for	  the	  
UK,	  the	  Van	  Rompuy	  document	  proposes	  an	  increase	  of	  respectively	  €300	  and	  €100	  million	  
for	   Germany	   and	   the	   Netherlands,	   a	   decrease	   of	   €25	   million	   for	   Sweden,	   and	   the	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  British	  rebate.	  	  
	  
The	  lump-­‐sums	  system	  proposed	  by	  the	  Commission	  would	  be	  politically	  difficult	  to	  adopt.	  
The	  Van	  Rompuy	  proposal	  clearly	  shows	  that	   it	   is	  not	  an	  option	   for	   the	  UK	  to	  abandon	   its	  
rebate.	  The	  budgetary	  negotiations	  could	  therefore	  end	  up	  with	  an	  agreement	  where	  the	  UK	  
could	  potentially	  accept	  a	  higher	  EU	  budget	   (or	  another	  request	   it	  would	  not	  have	   initially	  
agreed	   on)	   against	   the	  maintenance	   of	   its	   rebate.	  Moreover,	   given	   that	   the	   current	   VAT-­‐
based	  own	  resource	  is	  an	  essential	  data	  for	  calculating	  the	  UK	  correction,	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  
elimination	  of	  the	  VAT	  resource	  is	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  tackling	  the	  correction	  
mechanisms.	  The	  direction	  of	  these	  two	  debates	  could	  thus	  influence	  each	  other	  in	  one-­‐way	  
or	  another.	  	  
3.3.    Reducing the collection costs on the TOR’s proceeds 
The	  system	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  traditional	  own	  resources	  will	  remain	  unchanged.	  However,	  
as	  explained	  in	  section	  2.2.,	  the	  percentage	  of	  collection	  costs	  retained	  on	  the	  proceeds	  of	  
the	   TOR	   is	   often	   deemed	   higher	   than	   the	   actual	   collection	   costs	   supported	   by	   Member	  
States.	   In	   order	   to	   address	   this	   issue,	   the	   Commission	   has	   proposed	   a	   reduction	   of	   the	  
collection	  costs	  on	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  traditional	  own	  resources	  from	  25%	  to	  10%	  starting	  1	  
January	  2014.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  collection	  costs	  will	  not	  be	  lowered	  to	  10%	  in	  the	  final	  
agreement.	  The	  recent	  proposal	  from	  Mr	  Van	  Rompuy	  has	  suggested	  for	  Member	  States	  to	  
retain	   15%	   of	   the	   collection	   costs	   on	   the	   amounts	   collected	   by	   them.	   Moreover,	   an	  
important	  reduction	  of	  the	  collection	  costs	  on	  the	  TOR’s	  proceeds	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  
amounts	  could	  be	  questioned	  for	  several	  reasons.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	  the	  Commission	  has	  based	  its	  proposal	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  collection	  costs	  are	  a	  
form	   of	   hidden	   correction	  mechanism.	   	   Yet,	   contrary	   to	   the	   rebates,	   all	   the	   EU	  Member	  
States	  can	  retain	  the	  same	  rate	  on	  the	  proceeds	  from	  TOR	  as	  collection	  costs.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  the	  collection	  costs	  retained	  by	  the	  Member	  States	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  correct	  excessive	  
net	   positions	   of	   Member	   States	   but	   to	   invest	   in	   both	   infrastructure	   and	   administrative	  
services,	  thus	  improving	  trade	  flows	  from	  and	  to	  other	  Member	  States.	  In	  a	  Communication	  
of	  December	  2012	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  customs	  union,	  the	  Commission	  highlights	  “the	  value	  
added	   and	   fundamental	   importance	   of	   the	   services	   that	   the	   customs	   union	   provides	   as	   a	  
foundation	  of	  growth,	  competitiveness	  and	  security	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  and	  the	  European	  
Union”.91	   Acting	   as	   a	   “guardian	   of	   the	   internal	   market”,	   customs	   must	   deliver	   various	  
services,	  including	  trade	  facilitation,	  law	  enforcement	  (related	  for	  example	  to	  public	  health,	  
consumer	  protection,	  the	  environment	  and	  agriculture),	  supply	  chain	  security	  and	  the	  fight	  
                                                
91	  European	  Commission,	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  the	  Council	  and	  
the	  European	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Committee	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Customs	  Union,	  COM	  (2012)	  791	  final,	  
Brussels,	  21	  December	  2012.	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against	  fraud.92	  In	  accordance	  with	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  collection	  costs	  are	  to	  be	  understood	  
in	  a	  broad	  sense	  to	  include	  all	  the	  customs	  related	  challenges,	  in	  particular	  facilitating	  trade	  
and	   enforcing	   legislation	   to	   protect	   the	   security	   and	   safety	   of	   the	   EU.	   The	   costs	   and	  
investment	  expenditure	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  these	  challenges	  differ	  between	  Member	  States	  
according	  to	  the	   importance	  of	   their	  Union’s	  points	  of	  entry.	  Reducing	  the	  collection	  costs	  
too	  much	  might	  thus	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  internal	  market.	  Several	  Member	  States,	  
particularly	   in	   this	   time	   of	   public	   debt	   crisis,	   might	   be	   inclined	   to	   reduce	   investments	   in	  
transport	  and	  customs	  services.	  The	  effects	  would	  be	  negative	  not	  only	   for	  Member	  State	  
individually,	   but	   for	   the	   EU	   as	   a	   whole,	   given	   that	   these	   investments	   are	   crucial	   for	   “the	  
growth,	  competitiveness	  and	  security	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  and	  the	  European	  Union”.93	  	  
	  
Thirdly,	   the	   Commission	   recognises	   that	   in	   the	   last	   decades	   the	   customs	   union’s	  
performance	  has	  faced	  new	  challenges.	  Some	  of	  these	  challenges	  stem	  from	  the	  increasing	  
globalisation	   of	   trade,	   stricter	   and	   more	   detailed	   legislation,	   new	   business	   models	   and	  
logistics,	   as	   well	   as	   globalisation	   of	   crime	   and	   other	   threats.94	   At	   a	   time	   where	  Member	  
States	  need	  to	  do	  increasingly	  more	  with	  increasingly	  less,	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  Commission	  
to	  reduce	  by	  more	  than	  half	  the	  amounts	  retained	  by	  Member	  States	  on	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  
TOR	  seems	  thus	  rather	  questionable.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  collection	  costs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  insurance	  mechanism	  against	  future	  
liabilities	  that	  might	  arise	  due	  to	  carrying	  out	  custom	  services	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  EU.	  Member	  
States	   are	   required	   to	  perform	  custom	  services	   in	   a	   sound	  manner.	  A	  Member	   State	   risks	  
being	  fined	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  do	  so.	  For	  instance,	  the	  EU	  can	  hold	  a	  Member	  State	  liable	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  
collect	   the	  customs	  duties	  or	   it	   is	   late	   in	  making	   them	  available	   to	   the	  EU	  budget.95	  Other	  
claims	  may	   arise	   from	   a	   natural	   or	   a	   legal	   person	   when	   a	  Member	   State	   does	   not	  meet	  
legislation	  related	  to	  customs.	  As	  Member	  States	  perform	  custom	  services	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  
EU,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  EU	  should	  carry	  a	  part	  of	  the	  potential	  legal	  liability	  through	  the	  
collection	  costs.	  
	  
Unsurprisingly,	   all	   of	   these	   reasons	   have	   caused	   some	   Member	   States	   to	   contest	   the	  
proposed	  reform.	  Retaining	  25%	  of	  custom	  duties	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	  collection	  costs	  
in	  a	  narrow	  sense.	  Yet,	  discussions	  on	  the	  matter	  should	  be	  careful	  about	  taking	  into	  account	  
all	   the	   Member	   States'	   costs	   linked	   to	   customs	   (e.g.	   investments,	   services	   and	   potential	  
liabilities).	   A	   more	   balanced	   approach	   should	   lead	   to	   a	   percentage	   of	   collection	   costs	  
retained	   by	   the	  Member	   States	   that	   is	   deemed	   fair	   from	   the	   points	   of	   view	   of	   both	   the	  
Member	  States	  and	  the	  EU. 
 
 
                                                
92	  Ibidem.	  
93	  Ibidem.	  
94	  Ibidem.	  	  
95	  See	  for	  example	  Case	  C-­‐392/02	  Commission	  v	  Denmark	  and	  Case	  C-­‐460/01	  Commission	  v	  the	  Netherlands.	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CONCLUSION 
According	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   and	   Mr	   Van	   Rompuy’s	   proposals,	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   EU	  
financing	  system	  “should	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  overall	  objectives	  of	  simplicity,	  transparency	  and	  
equity”.	  However,	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  different	  elements	  of	   the	  proposal	  has	  shown	  that	   it	  
will	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  reach.	  	  
	  
Finding	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  
reach	  politically.	  Introducing	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  in	  the	  EU	  budget	  is	  nevertheless	  
essential	   for	   several	   reasons.	  Beyond	   increasing	   the	   financial	   autonomy	  of	   the	  EU	   level	   of	  
government	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Treaty,	   it	   could	   potentially	   address	   the	   juste	   retour	   issue,	  
increase	   visibility	   and	   accountability	   towards	   the	   EU	   citizens,	   and	   establish	   a	   direct	   link	  
between	  the	  financing	  of	  the	  EU	  budget	  and	  EU	  policy	  domains,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  EU	  policy	  objectives.	  Consequently,	  this	  would	  represent	  a	  significant	  political	  step	  
towards	  more	  European	  integration.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   illusory	   to	   believe	   that	   there	   could	   be	   an	   ideal	   own	   resource	   that	   could	   fulfil	   all	   the	  
economic,	   political	   and	   administration	   considerations	   that	   the	   financing	   system	  of	   the	   EU	  
has	   to	   reconcile.	   The	   present	   system,	   mainly	   composed	   of	   the	   GNI-­‐based	   resource,	   is	  
satisfactory	   in	   that	   it	   ensures	   the	   sufficiency	   and	   the	   stability	   of	   revenues	   while	   being	  
relatively	   fair.	   However,	   it	   favours	   an	   accounting	   logic	   of	   juste	   retour,	  making	   the	   system	  
increasingly	  complex	  while	  failing	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  wider	  net	  benefits	  of	  the	  process	  
of	   integration.	   	   The	   proposal	   of	   introducing	   two	   new	   genuine	   own	   resources	   in	   the	   EU	  
financing	  system	  would	  therefore	  improve	  the	  current	  system.	  It	  would	  combine	  the	  positive	  
aspects	   of	   introducing	   more	   genuine	   own	   resources	   with	   the	   advantages	   of	   the	   current	  
system.	  The	  GNI	  resource	  would	  be	  partially	  replaced	  by	  the	  new	  VAT	  resource	  and	  the	  FTT	  
resource	  but	  maintained	  as	  a	  residual	  resource	  to	  assure	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  EU	  budget.	  The	  
EU	  would	  therefore	  be	  financially	  more	  independent	  from	  Member	  States’	  national	  treasury.	  
Yet,	   it	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   how	   and	   when	   these	   new	   genuine	   own	   resources	   will	   be	  
implemented.	  
	  	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   proposal	   of	   a	   new	   VAT-­‐based	   resource,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   it	   will	   be	  
adopted	   for	   the	   next	  MFF	   as	   its	   implementation	   has	   already	   been	   postponed	   to	   January	  
2021	  at	  the	  latest.	  Although	  this	  new	  genuine	  own	  resource	  would	  bring	  many	  advantages	  
compared	  to	  the	  current	  VAT-­‐based	  resource,	  Member	  States	  are	  sensitive	  to	  issues	  related	  
to	  tax	  harmonisation	  as	  well	  as	  to	  their	  net	  balances.	  Economically,	  the	   impact	  of	  the	  new	  
VAT	  resource	  would	  be	  limited,	  but	  the	  abolishment	  of	  the	  current	  complex	  compensations	  
to	  the	  tax-­‐base	  would	  alter	  Member	  States’	  net	  balances.	  Some	  Member	  States	  could	  thus	  
potentially	  call	  for	  new	  compensations	  in	  the	  future.	  Regarding	  political	  and	  administrative	  
considerations,	   the	   new	   VAT	   resource	   would	   greatly	   simplify	   the	   current	   procedure	   and	  
create	  a	  genuine	   link	  between	  the	  national	  VAT	  systems	  and	   the	  EU	  budget.	   It	  would	  also	  
make	  the	  system	  more	  transparent	  and	  predictable	  with	  limited	  administration	  costs.	  	  
	  
Regarding	   the	   proposal	   for	   a	   FTT-­‐based	   resource,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   adopted	   under	   enhanced	  
cooperation,	   it	   is	  nothing	  but	  sure	   that	   the	  participating	  Member	  States	  will	  accept	   to	  use	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the	   revenue	   of	   the	   tax	   as	   a	   means	   to	   finance	   the	   EU	   budget.	   Introducing	   a	   FTT	   under	  
enhanced	  cooperation	  would	  be	  a	  political	  choice.	  Opinion	  polls	  show	  that	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  
the	  European	  public	  is	  in	  favour	  of	  taxing	  the	  financial	  sector.	  The	  tax	  could	  raise	  important	  
revenue,	   an	   advantage	   for	   national	   governments	   that	   have	   a	   hard	   time	   balancing	   their	  
budgets.	  	  
	  
Economically,	   the	   overall	   impact	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   FTT	   will	   depend	   on	   several	  
factors	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  assess,	  such	  as	  the	  true	  incidence	  of	  the	  tax,	  the	  risk	  of	  relocation	  
and	   the	  FTT’s	  ability	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	  of	   financial	   crises.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  FTT	  would	  most	  
likely	   act	   as	   a	   deterrent	   for	   transactions	   that	   do	   not	   enhance	   the	   efficiency	   of	   financial	  
markets.	   The	   distributional	   implications	   of	   a	   FTT	   in	   terms	   of	   vertical	   equity	   are	   typically	  
progressive	   in	   that	   it	   is	   taking	  more	   from	   those	  who	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   pay.	   In	   terms	   of	  
horizontal	  equity	  though,	  there	  are	  two	  major	  issues.	  Not	  only	  would	  much	  of	  the	  revenue	  
would	  appear	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  participating	  countries	  hosting	  big	  financial	  centres,	  but	  a	  
FTT	   adopted	   under	   enhanced	   cooperation	   would	   also	   keep	   fragmentation	   in	   the	   internal	  
market	  for	  financial	  services.	  Yet,	  a	  FTT	  under	  enhanced	  cooperation	  would	  be	  better	  than	  
nothing.	   Under	   administrative	   and	   political	   considerations,	   the	   assessment	   of	   a	   FTT	   is	  
globally	  positive	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  determine	  how	  difficult	  it	  would	  
be	   to	   implement	   under	   enhanced	   cooperation.	   Although	   the	   tax	   would	   not	   be	   able	   to	  
guarantee	  the	  sufficiency	  and	  stability	  of	  revenue	  due	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  various	  economic	  
factors	  on	  its	  yields,	  it	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  raising	  significant	  revenues.	  The	  FTT	  should	  also	  
not	   bring	   about	   important	   collection	   costs	   if	   good	   use	   is	   made	   of	   existing	   market	  
infrastructures.	  As	   a	   genuine	  own	   resource,	   a	   FTT	  would	  not	  only	  make	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	  
participating	  Member	  States	  to	  accurately	  calculate	  their	  net	  contributions	  due	  to	  the	  cross-­‐
boundary	  nature	  of	  the	  tax,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  create	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  EU	  policy	  objectives	  and	  
a	  relative	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  towards	  tax-­‐payers.	  	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   current	   correction	  mechanisms,	   it	   is	   already	   almost	   certain	   that	   the	  
British	  rebate	  will	  be	  maintained	  for	  the	  next	  MFF.	  The	  introduction	  of	  a	  lump	  sums	  system	  
for	  Germany,	   the	  Netherlands	  and	  Sweden	  would	  nevertheless	  create	  a	  more	  transparent,	  
simple,	  accountable	  and	  fair	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  reduction	  of	  the	  collection	  costs	  on	  the	  proceeds	  of	  the	  traditional	  own	  resources	  from	  
25%	  to	  10%	  or	  even	  to	  15%	  is	  questionable.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  retaining	  25%	  of	  custom	  duties	  as	  
collection	  costs	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  actual	  collection	  costs	  incurred	  by	  each	  Member	  
State.	   However,	   at	   a	   time	   where	   the	   customs	   union’s	   performance	   faces	   new	   challenges	  
linked	   to	   the	   increasing	   globalisation,	   the	   collection	   costs	   must	   be	   interpreted	   largely	   as	  
including	  all	  the	  vital	  costs	  and	  investments	  aiming	  to	  improve	  trade	  flows,	  enforce	  law,	  and	  
cover	   potential	   liabilities	   incurred	   by	   Member	   States	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   EU.	   A	   balanced	  
approach	  taking	  into	  account	  all	  these	  costs	  and	  investments	  must	  therefore	  be	  found.	  	  
	  
Reforming	  the	  system	  of	  European	  own	  resources	  is	  possible,	  provided	  that	  there	  is	  enough	  
political	   will.	   However,	   in	   a	   period	   of	   economic	   and	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   ambitious	   reform	  
plans	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  next	  MFF	  have	  already	  provoked	  strong	  reactions	  from	  the	  
Member	   States.	   The	   European	   Council	   President’s	   proposal	   still	   represents	   a	   slight	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improvement	  compared	  to	  the	  current	  system.	  The	  new	  VAT-­‐based	  resource	  and	  the	  lump-­‐
sums	  system	  could	  clearly	  bring	  more	  “simplicity	  and	  transparency”.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  case	  where	  
the	   FTT	   is	   adopted	   under	   enhanced	   cooperation	   and	   used	   as	   a	  means	   to	   finance	   the	   EU	  
budget,	   it	   could	   potentially	   bring	   transparency	   but	   not	   simplicity	   to	   the	   own	   resources	  
system.	  With	  respect	  to	  “equity”,	  the	  whole	  proposal,	  except	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  British	  
rebate,	  should	  give	  rise	  to	  positive	  changes.	  	  
	  
The	  final	  agreement	  for	  the	  next	  MFF	  will	  most	  likely	  bring	  marginal	  change	  from	  the	  status	  
quo.	  It	   is	   indeed	  far	  from	  certain	  that	  new	  genuine	  own	  resources	  will	  be	  adopted	  and	  the	  
most	  controversial	   correction	  mechanism,	  namely	   the	  British	   rebate,	  will	  probably	   remain.	  
This	   reform	   has	   nevertheless	   the	   great	   advantage	   of	   putting	   the	   discussion	   about	   the	  
necessity	  of	  more	  genuine	  own	  resources	  to	  finance	  the	  EU	  budget	  back	  on	  the	  table.	   It	   is	  
very	   likely	   that	   this	   debate	   will	   resurface	   during	   the	   next	   revision	   of	   the	   MFF	   in	   2020.	  
Therefore,	   it	   would	   be	   interesting	   to	   re-­‐examine	   other	   options	   of	   new	   genuine	   own	  
resources,	  such	  as	  various	  forms	  of	  carbon	  tax.	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EGMONT	   –	   The	   Royal	   Institute	   for	   International	   Relations	   is	   an	   independent	   think-­‐tank	  
based	   in	   Brussels.	   Its	   interdisciplinary	   research	   is	   conducted	   in	   a	   spirit	   of	   total	   academic	  
freedom.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  expertise	  of	   its	  own	  research	  fellows,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  external	  
specialists,	  both	  Belgian	  and	  foreign,	   it	  provides	  analysis	  and	  suggests	   international	  policy	  
options	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  as	  operational	  as	  possible.	  	  	  
Benefiting	  from	  the	  role	  acquired	  by	  Brussels	  in	  the	  global	  arena	  and	  from	  the	  prestigious	  
setting	  of	  the	  Egmont	  Palace,	  the	  Institute	  offers	  an	  ideal	  forum	  to	  visiting	  Heads	  of	  State,	  
Heads	  of	  government,	  representatives	  of	  international	  organisations,	  foreign	  ministers	  and	  
other	  political	  figures.	  	  	  
Conferences,	   colloquia	   and	   seminars	  nurture	   the	  work	  of	   the	   research	   fellows.	   They	  also	  
give	  participants	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exchange	  views	  with	  other	  specialists	  and	  with	  a	  well-­‐
informed	   public	   made	   up	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	   political,	   economic	   and	   academic	  
spheres,	  the	  media	  and	  civil	  society.	  	  	  
Along	   with	   research	   and	   meetings,	   the	   Institute	   has	   also	   developed	   specialised	   training	  
activities,	   both	   in	   Brussels	   and	   abroad.	   It	   can,	   on	   request,	   offer	   specific	   programmes	   for	  
visiting	  and	  resident	  diplomats	  and	  foreign	  professionals.	  	  	  
Closer	  collaboration	  with	  other	  research	  centres,	  both	  in	  Belgium	  and	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  
and	  beyond,	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  joint	  conferences	  and	  in	  more	  structured	  




Situated	   in	   Brussels	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   EU	   political	   decision-­‐making,	   the	   European	   Affairs	  
Programme	  seeks	  to	  provide	  in-­‐depth	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  analyses	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  topics	  
occupying	   EU	   policy-­‐makers.	   Special	   attention	   is	   devoted	   to	   those	   matters	   that	   are,	   or	  
ought	   to	   be,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   contemporary	   EU	   policy	   debate.	   Hence,	   aside	   from	   a	  
continuous	   focus	   on	   institutional	   matters,	   various	   substantive	   EU	   policies	   such	   as	   the	  
financial,	  economic	  and	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis,	  climate	  change,	  the	  single	  market	  as	  well	  as	  
energy,	  have	  dominated	  recent	  years’	  research	  agenda.	  	  
Intent	  on	  reaching	  the	  broadest	  audience	  possible,	  the	  European	  Affairs	  Programme	  seeks	  
to	  share	  its	  expertise	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  publications	  as	  well	  as	  by	  organizing	  roundtables,	  
expert-­‐seminars	  and	  conferences.	  
The	  European	  Affairs	  Programme’s	  main	  research	  areas	  are:	  	  
• The	  financial,	  economic	  and	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis;	  
• The	  EU	  Post-­‐2013:	  Multiannual	  Financial	  Framework,	  Common	  Agricultural	  Policy	  &	  
Cohesion	  Policy;	  	  
• Climate	  and	  Energy	  policies;	  
• Internal	  Market;	  
• Institutional	  Matters.	  
About the EGMONT Institute 
About the European Affairs Programme 
